

Marine Corps Gazette

FEBRUARY 1955

THIRTY CENTS



the little picture

Marine Corps Gazette

FEBRUARY 1955

NUMBER 2

VOLUME 39

PROFESSIONAL MAGAZINE FOR UNITED STATES MARINES

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COVER



It may not be warm and balmy where you are, but you can bet there are Marines in other parts of the world who are sweating out troop and drill and field problems in tropical climes. Of course the daily grind of training is always interspersed with the welcome "take 10"—time for a smoke, a drink of water, or time to read that letter again. But hovering in the background will be that voice of authority ready with "Saddle up" when the sand runs out of the glass. The cover is the work of Sgt Roger Ferriter, USMCR.

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Giant trees were uprooted and broken like matchsticks by winds of more than 100 miles an hour.



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"Thanks," says local installer to out-of-town helper.



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It was, as always, a challenge to the telephone companies. Local employees responded instantly. Companies in other states were quick to send help.

"The hurricane had not blown itself out," said one newspaper editorial, "before aid was on its way. Expert repair crews with their familiar green trucks hurried into the stricken communities with the dispatch of reserve army divisions rushing to stem an enemy break-through in a vital battle line."

Along with the will and the skill of telephone people to handle emergencies came the millions of miles of wire and the thousands of tons of equipment that were needed for the job. These were provided by Western Electric, the Bell System's manufacturing and supply unit.

One of the heart-warming things to us was the friendly understanding of the people in the storm-ridden communities.

To them go the thanks of all the telephone men and women who took part in the work of restoration.

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Christmastree Commandos

... *A Challenge from Within* by Col Heinl, especially his view about an NCO school for Staff NCOs or a tour of duty as a DI, as excellent. If an NCO *can't cut the mustard* he should not be a NCO. Bring back the old chevrons, let's have our Gunnys, our Techs and our Sgts Maj.

A Look at Our Awards by Col Batterton: let the awards go to those who earned them—why a Korean Service (prior July '53) for those who were in the 3d MarDiv and *never* saw Korea! Throw away the National Defense Service, it means nothing. Men in the 4th Marines wear the National Defense, PUC (Navy) and the Army DUC, 3 ribbons and they are *heroes*. Instead of giving everyone a ribbon and looking like Christmas trees, let's follow Colonel Batterton's article and go back to the intended high values of our awards.

JACK W. JOURNAL
SSgt, USMC

Camp McGill, Japan

More Firepower?

... *More Firepower—Smaller Units* presents a few too many contradictions among its glittering generalities to sell the FN as a replacement for our two standard weapons.

First—keep the present T/O and multiply firepower three or four times.

With the BAR, the combined efforts of both the BAR-man and the ABAR-man are needed to keep the nucleus of the fire team in action and provided with ammunition—even with a good BAR-man firing in short bursts. Not only does the BAR-man carry magazines, but so does the ABAR-man in addition to his own clipped M1 ammunition. These two men are more heavily burdened than the rifleman and the fire team leader, and it is very doubtful that a fire team could efficiently operate even two BARs. If every man were equipped with a magazine-fed FN it is improbable that the firepower of every rifleman could be increased efficiently without increasing his present load. In addition, because of the resultant increased ammunition expenditure, one of the most difficult problems of the rifle company—resupply during a firefight—compounds itself. There have been times when even the BAR is a luxury not to be taken for granted, under such conditions.

What would happen to fire control on the fire team and squad level? A problem confronting even the most experienced fire team leader is the constant co-ordination of effective aimed fire properly distributed over the entire target.

Difficulty in fire control would also increase the difficulty of unit control while under fire. In addition, our present fire team and squad tactics would soon need vast

overhauling. What would constitute the nucleus of our fire team? What would justify the utilization of 4 riflemen as a team? Around what sound concept could small unit formations be logically devised? Above all, what degree of fire superiority would be necessary to support maneuver? Even with our present set-up, unit control and unit fire control can be extremely taxing.

Second—the popular rage—economy—seemed to father the idea of reduction in T/O while retaining the same firepower.

The capabilities of the new 10,000 man division must be equal to the capabilities of the 20,000 man division in order to justify its adoption. For example, consider frontage. Frontage is determined by control and contact (among other things). Control and contact are factors peculiar more to the human beings with whom we are dealing than with their weapons or equipment. Therefore, the density of forward positions, regardless of the weapons in use, will be fairly constant. How then, can we reduce the density and still maintain control and contact over a given frontage, regardless of the potential firepower? Reduced density would also mean that each man must cover a larger target in a shorter time, further reducing the number of *aimed* rounds fired. In order to properly occupy the division frontage established by present doctrine we need the men to fill the holes—which takes us back to the larger division.

How about security—listening posts and combat outposts? Manning them would result in such a depletion of personnel that even if our weapons could produce triple the rate of fire presently realized, it would be impossible to obtain. To provide outposts and patrols would require such a high percentage of the available personnel that efficiency—especially in extended campaigns—would suffer. Also, where would replacements from within the units be derived?

If we must sacrifice some quality in the Marine division in order to adopt the FN, why sacrifice security, efficiency, control and the ability to punch hard and keep moving?

P. A. WICKWIRE
Capt, USMC

Annapolis, Md.



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Firepower? — Cont'd.

... More Firepower? Firepower—as I see it—is the essence of creating the new rifles. More firepower for the unit regardless of size. If we cut the size of the squad, platoon, etc. all we have, any way you look at it, is the same firepower as before. There are also other aspects that Col Nihart's article did not mention, mainly: 4 men can only fire on 4 targets at one time, what about the other 5 targets (the least, if the fire-team leaders are directing their teams' fires) that our present day squad can bring under fire? What about the leadership training our junior NCOs get leading a fire team? How accurate would the fire of the 4 man squad be if they had to cover 9 targets with 4 weapons (remembering that it isn't the rounds fired per minute, but the hits per rounds fired per minute that count in a fire fight)? How about the load capacity of the individual man? To increase his ammo load,



in comparison with the cut in squad suggested, would give each man 3 units of fire, minimum. This, with the slight reduction in weight the new cartridge offers, would add approximately 10 lbs. to the load he already carries.

Granted, mobility increases as numbers decrease. But to what good if the rifleman is so weighted down he can't move or can't advance be-

cause he is pinned down after he passes the line of departure?

MARTIN S. CHRISTIE
Capt, USMC

Quantico, Va.

Nippon Flame

... LtCol Fletcher's article on flame throwers (December 1954) made no mention of those employed by the Japanese. Two similar models of this weapon (the first developed about 1933, the second in 1940) were employed by the Japanese army in World War II, although the use of flame was on a much smaller scale than in the American, British, German or Italian armies. American forces first encountered Japanese flame throwers on Bataan in 1942, but the weapon was used only a few times. On Guadalcanal, US Marines and soldiers captured more than a dozen Japanese flame throwers, none of which had been put in action against the Americans.

The Japanese flame thrower had a maximum range of 30 yards and could eject a continuous stream for 10 to 12 seconds. Its fuel unit consisted of two cylindrical tanks, with a total capacity of 3.25 gallons, and a nitrogen pressure cylinder. A blank cartridge was used to ignite the fuel jet, and 10 of these cartridges were loaded in a revolving cylinder at the nozzle end of the flame gun. Carried on the back of its operator, the weapon weighed 55 pounds when charged.

The Japanese apparently had no flame thrower tanks, although late in the war Japanese tanks with portable flame throwers attached were discovered by American troops.

STANLEY FALK
Capt, USAR

Washington 15, D. C.

Something Old, Something New..

... Since reporting to duty as a recruiter over a year ago I have been concerned with the changing of the drill. Coming into the Corps after World War II, I have never before encountered the new (or should I say old) drill. I shudder to think of returning to the FMF and finding myself less informed than the Marine just out of boot camp.

Marine Corps Gazette • February, 1955

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I am sure that there are many procedures that will have changed during my 3-year tour as a recruiter. I also realize that recruiters are not the only Marines who will be faced with this problem.

Therefore, what I suggest is this. Set up a unit either at the recruit depots or at duty stations throughout the Corps to retrain and instruct all Marines returning from detached duty. By doing this, NCOs would report to their units competent, efficient Marines fully capable of performing their duty.

EARL G. DARLINGTON
Sgt, USMC

Chillicothe, Mo.

Squads Left

... It grieves me to impugn the dope disseminated by an oft-quoted source of authoritative information, but the GAZETTE erred in its December 1954 issue.

In your article *Squads Right*, you have diagrams of platoon turning movements, specifically platoon right and right turn, incorrectly labeled. My reference for correction is para 21, figs 27 and 28 CMC letter AO3C-mrh of 25 May 1954 and several hours practical application here at Parris Island.

Could the mistake lie with your left-footed civilian printers who, ostensibly, do not know the difference between a fixed pivot and a moving pivot?

JOSEPH E. COLEMAN, JR.
1stLt, USMC

Parris Island, S. C.

ED: It is in error as printed. The captions should be inverted.

Basic School for Wives

... It appears to me that a Marine Corps wide program could be instituted to make easier and more pleasant the initiation of many young wives into Marine Corps life, and at the same time retain many officers and NCOs we are now losing.

In my unit alone there are instances where several competent young reserve and regular officers who like the Corps and desire to make it a career have been deterred from this course because of the dissatisfaction of their wives.

Many newly commissioned officers marry young ladies who have previously had no experience with service

life and are frightened away from it by the many tales they hear and by their ignorance about what their life in the service will be like.

I realize that most of the help must necessarily be given by local commands, however, if these women could be given indoctrination classes at the same time as their husbands are attending Basic School, it might help familiarize new wives with the life, reduce the strangeness which surrounds them and make them feel like they belong. These classes could be conducted in such subjects as:

1. History and traditions
2. Basic organization of the Marine Corps
3. Social activities and obligations
4. Activities and services available to dependents
5. Procedures for shipping household effects, obtaining housing, tips in moving, allotments, etc.
6. Savings plan
7. Wives' clubs
8. Driving Instructions
9. Customs and Courtesies
10. Tours of selected installations

To this list could be added other subjects that would be beneficial. The success of such a program would be directly proportional to the quality of instruction and the tact with which it was presented.

In addition to this program a Marine Corps policy could be promulgated to encourage all posts and stations to help dependents in various ways: advance notice on permanent transfer and extended training cruises; assistance in short local moves; special field problems and demonstrations for dependents; school buses to post schools. These are just a few things that could be done.

To retain many of the high quality junior officers and staff NCOs as career Marines it is necessary to win over their wives.


F. H. WALDROP
Capt, USMC

Camp Lejeune, N. C.

Can Anyone Lead?

... In regards to LtCol Samuel B. Folsom's merit promotion system, I'm afraid I'll have to concur with his lucid appraisals. We all seem to age very successfully without effort or ability, and yet it is ability and

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
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NEW SERVICE STARTS—Hostesses of five airlines—United, Western, Pan American, American and TWA—cut a ribbon to open Los Angeles Airways' first helicopter

passenger route after eight years of scheduled mail operations. First passenger service is between Long Beach and Los Angeles International Airport, with Sikorsky S-55s.

AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS



RCAF SIKORSKYS—First all-helicopter squadron in the Royal Canadian Air Force is now in operation with rugged Sikorsky S-55s. These wilderness-proved transport helicopters are now based at Bagotville, Quebec. Here are four of ten S-55s in the initial Canadian order. All were flown to Canada from Sikorsky's plant.



BRITISH USE S-55s—Helicopter passenger service between London Airport and Waterloo is scheduled to begin this spring. British European Airways will use S-55s for the flights, which take 18 minutes each way compared to more than an hour by surface travel. BEA pioneered helicopter passenger flights in 1950 with S-51s.



America's First Truly Successful Helicopter —Sikorsky VS-300



MAY 20, 1940—First public view of Sikorsky's historic VS-300—America's first truly successful helicopter—came May 20, 1940 as Igor Sikorsky was awarded Helicopter Pilot License No. 1. The VS-300 was only the first of many Sikorsky achievements in advancing helicopter development and industry-leading production efficiency.

SERVICE EXPANDS—New York Airways has expanded scheduled helicopter passenger service both north and south from its New York City inter-airport routes. Cities added were Trenton and New Brunswick, New Jersey, on the south, and suburban White Plains, New York, and Stamford, Conn., on the north. Above, passengers board a Sikorsky S-55 at the heliport in Stamford.



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effort, regardless of accumulated years, that fashions the key of success.

Alexander the Great had the known world under his thumb and managed to be dead by the time he was 22. This, of course, is an impossibility in our system. Because of it, I wonder how much successful and usable leadership has been overlooked?

Almost any careful person can grow old, but can just anyone lead?

G. RULE
Capt, USMCR

Milwaukee 4, Wisc.

Taking Issue

... Having just read LtCol Heintz's fine article on NCOs (November 1954) I wish to take issue with one point, i.e., that specialist outfits need technical ability rather than good leadership. In my opinion this oft encountered idea is a fallacy. The best technical ability is useless without good organization and leadership to properly employ and direct it.



Good staff NCO leadership is needed just as much in a specialist unit as in any other Marine Corps organization. The Marine Corps' concern with this problem was demonstrated by the establishment of the Operational Communication Chiefs' Course for staff NCOs. This

course aims not at making radio operators or telephone men, but at developing competent platoon chiefs who can direct and control platoons by proper leadership.

With reference to accepting radar specialists as NCOs in early World War II days, this practice was discontinued and generally considered unsatisfactory because too many of these men were promoted to NCO without being basically Marines and leaders.

CLYDE R. NELSON
Col, USMC

Newport, R. I.

For Future Reference

... I wish to extend a well done to MSgt Roberts on his recent article, *Packing in Winter Operations*. It is gratifying to note that emphasis is being placed on cold weather operations on a Corps-wide basis.

A factor which is of paramount importance to unit leaders of every level, when conducting tactical operations in mountainous terrain under conditions of snow and extremely low temperatures, is the conservation of each individual's energy and physical stamina. This factor was stressed by MSgt Roberts ... and it would behoove everyone to stow this bit of information away for future reference.

W. A. ALLABAND
2dLt, USMCR

Camp Pendleton, Calif.

New Boats

... In recent months several articles have appeared in the *GAZETTE* about Marine Corps amphibious reconnaissance units and equipment. I am particularly interested in learning if the Marine Corps has "officially" designated the new nylon reconnaissance boats as authorized items of equipment to be used by reconnaissance units.

Your co-operation in this matter will be greatly appreciated.

D. A. SILVA
Capt, USMC

San Diego, Calif.

Ed: Pres, MCEB has advised that ... the Marine Corps has approved, and recently placed in the T/A a 4-man 1,100 pound boat as a replacement for the standard boat, in-

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flatable (plastic or nylon, 2-3 man), and a 9-man/2,450 pound boat as a replacement for the standard boat, inflatable (rubber, 10-man).

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The 4-man and 9-man boats are presently being procured and distributed to units of the FMF by the Quartermaster General.

Marking System

... Judging from the remarks of numerous officers and men and articles that appear in publications, from time to time, concerning the assignment of proficiency marks, it appears that the system of assigning these marks varies considerably among various officers and posts throughout the Corps. Since the future of the man receiving the

mark depends on a fair and consistent evaluation of his proficiency, it seems to me that all officers should be concerned in finding one good system to be used throughout the Marine Corps for arriving at a fair mark.

I am now using a system that may be the solution to the problem. While it may not be the best solution, I think it is at least a step in the right direction.

It is based on a combination of the NCO fitness report and the grades assigned to subjects on page 7 of the Service Record Book.

The grades assigned to the basic subjects, that every Marine must know, on the page 7 report, are based on examinations given at the end of instruction periods and actual observation of the Marine's proficiency in these subjects. One half of his proficiency mark is based on an average of the page 7 grades. The other 50 per cent of his proficiency grade is based on his other duties and his personal characteristics and is derived as follows. The NCOs make out the section "C" of the NCO Fitness Report on each of

their men. Emphasis should be placed on the importance of carefully observing each man in the various traits they will grade him on. The NCOs then get in a huddle with the platoon commander and compile the grades on each man, which range from unsatisfactory to outstanding. This can be done easily by calling out the man's name and subject, such as "Handling enlisted personnel," and have them raise their hands for outstanding, excellent and so on down the line. I have converted these grades to a numerical value as follows: Outstanding—9, Excellent—8, Above average—7, Average—6 or 5, Below average—4, Unsatisfactory—3 to 1; thus if the majority of the NCOs thought that the Marine was above average in "Handling enlisted personnel," he would be graded a 7 in that subject. This can be done quickly and easily by drawing a chart with the roster of men down the left side of the sheet and the list of subjects from the fitness report across the top of the sheet, then as each subject is graded the marks can be put in the corresponding columns along side of the man's name that is being graded.

The name and grades can be cut off in strips later and presented to the Marines so they may see what traits they are deficient in and try to improve themselves.

Naturally, privates and PFCs could not be graded on all of the subjects listed in Section C on the NCO Fitness Report form, such as "Handling Enlisted Personnel." Still, there are enough traits of his character listed to give the platoon commander a pretty good idea of the type of Marine with which he is dealing. Also, there are enough men observing the individual private or PFC so the platoon commander isn't given a one-sided or prejudiced view of the man.

I have just finished my third year of grading men under this system and one odd quirk has been brought to light. The fitness report grades have been extremely consistent with the page 7 grades. There is seldom more than one or two points difference between the two.

The biggest complaint I have heard about the system is that it consumes too much time. However, I have used it on an 81mm Mortar

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
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
Already key cities have the protection of a guided missile which can destroy the swiftest stratospheric bombers. This is Nike, *operational* result of long and versatile missile experience.

Douglas association with rockets and guided missiles has seen this company

at work with other industrial leaders and our Armed Forces—to move missile development from a dream of push-button warfare to a solid reality. You saw it in the Bumper Wac research rocket, world altitude champion, in Honest John—field artillery rocket with high explosive or atomic wallop—

in missiles of every type . . . air to air . . . air to ground . . . ground to ground . . . ground to air.

Douglas leadership in rocket airframe design has helped give us *operational* missiles in a relatively short span of time. Security cloaks even greater advances which are now on the way.



Depend on **DOUGLAS**



First in Aviation

platoon and a ship's detachment, grading an average of 75 men per period. The average time consumed has been about one day per period. Surely this isn't too much time to devote to the most important grade a Marine receives.

One of its advantages is that everyone gets in the act. An NCO is given a chance to show leadership and responsibility, something we don't see enough of these days.

At any rate the officer certainly knows his men better at the end of a grading period and he can recommend a completely fair and con-

sistent proficiency mark on them.

RICHARD M. WADSWORTH

Capt, USMC

USS *Antietam* (CVS-36)

Another Language

... There are many Marines commanding a knowledge of one or more foreign languages. They have the interest and desire to increase their fluency. Unfortunately for the individual Marine, obtaining sufficient language materials is difficult and costly.

Foreign military books and periodicals are the most difficult to buy.

In certain languages, they are available only through *pink* book stores. The present witch-hunting fantasia is such that a career Marine cannot afford to have his name on a *pink* catalogue list.

After several years of buying language materials, the individual Marine has a very sizeable investment that is expensive to insure and almost impossible to replace. The size of available housing enters in, also. There is little or no room to even unpack the books!

Since it is to the best interest of the Marine Corps, it is proper that steps be taken to encourage the foreign language proficiency of its personnel.

Two things that can be done now to materially assist these Marines are:

1. The Marine Corps Institute could provide advanced language courses. The medium could be a lending-type course.

A student would receive a book every two or three months. The subject matter to include literature, geography, science, military and undiluted propaganda.

The student would be required to write a book review. For example, if the book were in German, he would write his review in German. His grade would be determined by the quality of his review as well as facility in the language used.

For those languages where materials are particularly expensive or difficult to obtain, newspapers and magazines could be provided as text material.

2. The Marine Corps GAZETTE could obtain foreign language materials, preferably of a military nature, in the various tongues, i.e., Russian, German, French and Spanish. Selling them at a reasonable price would be of great assistance to those Marines commanding more than one language.

There are other solutions of course. However, these two can be started now with the facilities currently available. It could be the reason for many less headaches in the next war if the Marine Corps acts now to further language proficiency among its personnel.

SAMUEL L. GRIER



Capt, USMC

MCS, Quantico, Va.


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and tiny tubes . . .

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
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

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Typical of advanced design and performance in dial telephone switching systems is Kellogg Crossbar, developed by Kellogg Switchboard and Supply Company, a division of IT&T, for use in telephone exchanges. Together with Kellogg Relay-matic, as well as Step-by-Step and Rotary dial switching equipment made by Federal Telephone and Radio Company, also a division of IT&T, Kellogg provides a complete range of automatic switching systems as well as other equipment and supplies for the independent telephone industry.

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Microwave radio relay carries telephone circuits over mountains, rivers, deserts, lakes and other difficult terrain *without wire lines*. Between Bartow and Tampa, Fla., the Peninsular Telephone Co. has installed the first independent telephone company microwave link connecting with the nation-wide inter-toll dialing system. The complete equipment was designed by Federal Telecommunication Laboratories, research division of IT&T at Nutley, N. J.

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Our authors

✿ In 1946, **SSgt Richard Fortner** quit high school, at the age of 18, to join the Marine Corps. In 1954, in competition with field officers, company grade officers, civilians and many enlisted men senior to him, his entry, *The Little Picture* (page 16), was adjudged to be the best essay submitted in the Marine Corps Association's 1954 Essay Contest.

But before you attempt to draw an analogy using the two seemingly incongruous statements above, re-



SSGT FORTNER

view SSgt Fortner's accomplishments and experience during the 8-year interim between his enlistment and his prize-winning achievement.

He started his regular career as a seagoing Marine with ComCarDiv 4 in 1947 and during his three years aboard ship he completed enough MCI courses to enable him to graduate with the class of January 1950 at East Side High School, E. St. Louis, Ill. He had a brief tour as a machine gunner with the 6th Marines at Camp Lejeune in 1950 and then went to Guard Co, Port Lyautey until 1952.

In Korea in 1952-3, he was first a section leader of heavy machine guns with Wpns 3/7, received a meritorious promotion to staff sergeant and became platoon sergeant of a rifle platoon with H 3/7. Wounded twice in action, he was evacuated to the States and, after his discharge from the hospital, was ordered to Parris Island where he now serves as a rifle marksmanship instructor.

He lists as his hobbies, "the study of military tactics and doctrine," and says he was prompted to write the article by a "desire to shake loose a few hind ends off office chairs and get them out to really train our men instead of boring them."

✿ Professional acumen and a desire to disseminate as much information as possible to his comrades back home, led a Marine intelligence officer on duty in Europe to initiate a chain of events which brings some of the aspects of anti-guerrilla warfare on the Eastern Front (1941-45) to the pages of the *GAZETTE*.

One day, while engaged in conversation in a Munich *Bierstube*, he was impressed by the experiences of a former German officer in a type warfare generally unfamiliar to most Marines.

Ernst von Dohnanyi, who wrote *Combatting Soviet Guerrillas* (page 50) was born in Kiev, USSR, son of a German engineer who had emigrated to Russia during the Czarist period of industrial expansion early in the 20th Century. The situation of the capitalistic factory owners in the Soviet Russia forced the family to remove back to Germany in 1933. Dohnanyi received most of his education and orientation in Russia, finishing, however, at the German-Russian *Realgymnasium* in Breslau in 1933. Thereafter he entered the then expanding German Army, serving in the infantry and artillery as well as signal intelligence units. He served with distinction on the various fronts of WWII and was decorated with the Iron Cross, First Class and Second Class.

He was captured by the Red Army in 1944 and not released from captivity until 1952. Because of his background, he well understood the language and character of the Russian people. He has written of his experiences with the hope that they may be of some help to people who might some day be confronted with a similar task.

✿ With a firm conviction that we have made tactical mistakes in the past in our conception of operating outposts and strongpoints, **LtCol Henry J. Woessner**, II feels that those errors should be reviewed, given recognition and steps should be taken to change our concepts (*Strongpoints?* page 36).

LtCol Woessner came into the Marine Corps from the Naval Academy in 1941. During WWII he was with the 2d and 8th Defense Bns and aboard the USS *Baltimore*. He was CO of the V-12 unit at Purdue

in '45-'46 and CO of MB, Argentina, Nfld until 1948, and then became S-4 of the 2d ProvMar Regt. In Korea, LtCol Woessner served as Wpns Co CO of 3/7 and then became S-3 of the 7th Marines.

He came to MCS, Quantico in 1951 where he has been a tactics instructor. At the present time he is a student at Senior School.




LTCOL WOESSNER

LtCol Woessner says he wrote the article because much talk of future tactical concepts seems to be based on the same lack of appreciation of enemy capabilities which caused our mistakes in the past. It is essential, he believes, that we become aware of the situation in time.

✿ **Yoshitaka Horie**, a former general staff officer in the Imperial Japanese Army, compiled *The Last Days of General Kuribayashi* for us. Mr Horie obtained Gen Kuribayashi's personal letters from Mrs Kuribayashi, translated them, and then after further research, wrote the foreword to the letters.

Mr Horie was graduated from both the Japanese Military Academy and the War College and served as liaison officer between the Japanese Army and Navy. His service included campaigns in China where he was wounded.




MR HORIE

As a major, Mr Horie helped plan the defense of Iwo Jima under the late Gen Kuribayashi, but missed the campaign itself as he was transferred to Chichi Jima just before Iwo was invaded.

He learned his English from American flyers who were shot down around Chichi Jima and through his work as liaison officer between the Imperial Army and Navy, and the Occupation forces after the war.

Regular readers of *GAZETTE* will remember Mr Horie's *Japanese Defense of Iwo Jima*, which ran in the February 1952 *GAZETTE*.

Enlisted in 1941, commissioned through the meritorious NCO program in 1948, **Capt George E. Shepherd** (*Stand Up and Talk*—page 34) has done a lot of public speaking in



CAPT SHEPHERD

his day but this is his first attempt at writing anything.

After tours of duty at Parris Island, Quantico and Jacksonville, Fla, Capt Shepherd became sergeant major of VMJ-252 in the Pacific in July of 1943. He subsequently served in the same capacity with Ser Squad 22 during 1944 and became station sergeant major at MCAS, El Centro, in 1945. From 1946 to '48 he was sergeant major of the 2d and 9th MAWs at Cherry Point and then was ordered to Basic School at Quantico.

Since being commissioned he has been a rifle platoon leader at Camp Lejeune and in Korea and Special Services officer at MB, Portsmouth, Va. At the present time he is putting the principles of his article to good use daily in his job as an instructor in the Instructor Training Section of the MCEC at Quantico.

Author of half-a-dozen articles published previously in GAZETTE, **LtCol Frederick S. Aldridge** (*Amphibious Objectives*—page 62) entered the Marine Corps through the PLC program at Colgate University and completed Basic School in 1941. During WWII he served with both the 1st and 2d Mar Divs and between overseas assignments served a brief stint as artillery and aerial observer instructor at Quantico.



LTCOL ALDRIDGE

He graduated from Senior School in Quantico in 1951, and until he left for Korea last year he was an instructor in the tactics section there.

When last heard from, LtCol Aldridge was Asst G-3 of the 1st Mar Div serving as division plans officer

and doubling in duty as NGF officer and FSCC officer.

The Crawford-Stanfield writing team emerged naturally enough from their mutual association working as assistant G-4s at FMFLant headquarters in Norfolk, Va.

LtCol Philip L. Crawford who entered the Marine Corps in 1940 and completed flight training at Pensacola in 1941 bounced into WWII as operations officer in a fighter command on Guadalcanal in 1942. He finished up in MAG 12 (Philippines and China) where he was first a squadron commander and then group operations officer.



MAJ STANFIELD



LTCOL CRAWFORD

He was at Cherry Point in 1946-'47, he attended the 6th Junior Course at Quantico in 1948 and was Asst G-4 in the 2d Mar Div at Camp Lejeune in '48 and '50.

When the Korean emergency broke LtCol Crawford was an attack squadron commander at El Toro. In Korea he was first S-4 of MAG 6 and then an attack squadron commander.

Major James C. Stanfield enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1938 and was a gun captain aboard the USS *San Francisco* on December 7, 1941 at Pearl Harbor.

He received a field commission in the Pacific in 1943 while serving with the 1st Mar Div and returned to the States in 1945.

Since then he has served on staffs at Quantico, Camp Lejeune and Pearl Harbor.

Of the article, LtCol Crawford says, "I have served on staffs at higher and lower levels for a good part of the last 10 years. I have yet to see 2 staffs operating the same. . . . I started analyzing what was wrong, found a kindred soul in Maj Stanfield and you have the result." (*Our Unwieldy Staffs*—page 44.)

This Business of Aviation Intelligence (page 22) is the fourth article of **Capt James R. Johnson's** to appear in the GAZETTE. A prolific writer, Capt Johnson has had almost half a hundred articles and stories published in other publications in addition to GAZETTE.

Capt Johnson entered the Marine Corps in 1942 and has been associated with Marine



CAPT JOHNSON

air wings in liaison and intelligence capacities for the greater part of his Marine Corps career.


He was Asst S-2 of MAG 12 in Korea and after his return he attended Junior

School at MCS, Quantico, Va. He is now stationed at Camp Lejeune.

Major Norman G. Ewers, who wrote *Secondary Mission* on page 68, came into the Marine Corps through the Naval Cadet program and completed his flight training in 1943.

He left his first duty station, Cherry Point, in August '44 to go to the Solomons and VMB 423 where he piloted a B-25 until WWII was gasping its last.

Then he attended the 2d Class at Junior School and went to VMF-312 at El Toro, Calif.



MAJ EWERS

Graduating from the Electronics School at Memphis (NATTC) in 1950, he went to Korea where he served with VMO-6 from January until September '51.

Returning from Korea he joined the 2d MAW at Cherry Point for a few months until he was assigned his present job—with Marine Helicopter Group 26, MCAF, New River, N. C.

Major Ewers' area campaign medals are topped by the Silver Star, the DFC, the Air Medal and the Commendation Ribbon.

He was prompted to write the article, he says, because too many people tend to ignore the many sideline operations now being performed by the versatile helicopter.

Little P

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT UNVEILS new atomic weapon! Navy develops antisonar, antiradar submarine! New tank at Aberdeen proving grounds great success! Air Force reveals new super-sonic speed jet! Our policy of instant retaliation stands! Headlines, headlines. America stands ready! We are on guard. We are this, we are that. We have these and we have those. And to each and every man a pair of rose colored glasses.

It is true that we have all these new weapons and defenses. Perhaps we are the best armed and equipped nation on earth, but what has suddenly happened to the men? In all the newspapers and periodicals, I have not seen one article about a



new type of man that will go with all these new weapons. Have we all suddenly become absent minded professors? We have super bombs and super planes, but no supermen. They have remained the same since time began. Just plain, garden variety hunks of humanity.

maline training for the staff, but where does the little man fit in?

Picture

By SSgt
Richard M. Fortner

MARINE CORPS

1st Prize

Group III

(enlisted)

PRIZE ESSAY CONTEST

ASSOCIATION

Are we taking too much for granted? Have we so soon forgotten the lessons of Tarawa and Iwo Jima? Of Normandy and Anzio? Remember the paralyzing bombardments we gave those places? Remember the planes — so many they darkened the sky — the bombs that fell like raindrops? Remember the peaceful looking islands that suddenly erupted into infernos of fire and flame and smoke? Remember standing and seeing all that hell and saying to yourself, "Nothing can live through that?" Can you remember the dead, the wounded, the staggering count at the battle's end? For despite all our bombs and shells and rockets the enemy still lived and fought. When the big guns cooled

alone, would close with the enemy, grapple with destiny for their fate. One would fall and one would stand.

The Command says they are ready. Nothing further is required to develop their fighting effectiveness. What of the men? What do they say? Unfortunately, they feel this is not true. In many outfits the tendency to depend on new weapons and planning has overlooked the readiness of the *man*. As a man of the ranks, I say the men in these outfits are aware of this neglect and their lack of individual readiness.

Why? Why have our men this attitude? Briefly, bluntly, it's because they are *bored*. A man is like a sponge. If you pour water on it, it

find a few, a pitiful few, listening to instruction, while the rest sleep or merely sit and stare blankly at the instructor. It is the same in the field. They just plod along not knowing or caring what they do.

"Poor instruction," you cry. "Bad presentation." And why not? The instructor in many cases feels nearly the same as the men. It seems that no one cares how or when the men are instructed, just so long as they are putting in the time required. But they are not being instructed. They are being bored. Why? Why are our men being bored instead of trained? Enter, the "big picture." Our training has become so snarled with "big picture" planning that the men can no longer grasp it.



and the planes flew away, small boats filled with small men moved slowly toward the shore. Men, not armed with electronics or jet engines or atomic rays, but men armed with only rifles, bayonets and guts. In the tiny, firm grasp of these men lay victory or defeat. They, and they

will soak up the water, but only enough to wet itself—the rest merely runs off. We have pounded our men's wits with dull, blunt instruction until they too, are "running off." If you have doubt of what I say, then simply step into any classroom in the Corps. There you will

Throughout the Marine Corps today there are training programs going on that would bore the dead. "Boring? Boring," you say, "what about our field problems, the helicopter training, practice assaults at Little Creek and Vieques?" Oh, yes, they are fine. Simply fine — for the



Let company commanders handle their own training problems

staffs and higher commanders. But the *men*, the squads and fire teams, don't even know what's going on. They have an order to move forward so they move. Why? "Ah, who cares, let's get this over with and get back to the barracks." That is the classical and typical reply that rings forth from every man's mouth below the rank of captain.

Now all this is not news. Despite the headlines and reports we all know the conditions which exist. Our leaders know these problems and are constantly trying to relieve the pressure, but they have turned the problem over to the big picture men, the staffs and IGs.

True, the problem of training is a matter for the general's staff, but these men are sometimes so deeply immersed in red tape that they rarely find time to see the real problems. They have buried themselves and their thoughts in the "big picture," the overall scheme that deals in divisions and regiments. But training is not a big problem, it is a long series of little ones. Those big picture men are looking for dragons to slay, but there are no dragons. The real training that men receive is not the big operations that we pull every 6 months, it is the day-to-day training that's going on in your squadbays right now. These big picture men may well have the bird in the bush, but it is you, the company commanders and platoon leaders that have the bird in hand. Too often this golden link between command and execution of command is overlooked.


I wonder how many company

commanders have moaned over a training schedule that fit their particular unit like a football helmet on a monkey's tail? Why can't these officers who deal daily in the men's problems handle their own training schedules? For instance, he may receive a training schedule that requires that 10 hours' instruction in one week will be given over to such ironic subjects as forming to pitch shelter halves, while in his unit he has just received a whole new batch of men right out of boot camp. Why couldn't this officer be allowed to take these men and spend more valuable time working them into his unit as a part of his fighting force?

Well, what can be done? How can we split the big pictures into little ones? It would seem that everyone has his own ideas and his own opinions, but it also seems that no one is willing to do anything about them. My own thoughts and opinions of training may not be the ideal solution, but they are a step. Perhaps you will agree, perhaps you will disagree, but at any rate you will think about it and that is all that is really necessary. To think!

Now that those dusty cogs are beginning to turn, let's climb out of our ruts and see what goes on around and about us. From on high, we often get a list of subjects that the men are to receive instruction in each week. These lists are received by the battalion S-3 offices and the 1st Sergeants wherever there are Marines throughout the world. Training schedules are then diligently made out. But the sad thing about all this is that they are made

out sometimes days, weeks and even months before the men are scheduled to receive their instruction. To the corporals and sergeants, the backbone of our Marine Corps, these battalion S-3 offices are as far above them as the heavens. And to the S-3 officers, the thoughts, feelings and temperament of these men are as far below as the bottom of the sea. Again, I say, let the company commanders handle their own training problems. Let them, not someone a thousand miles away, de-



Make every man an instructor—let the men teach the men

cide from day to day what their men need.

If the company commanders were given this control, most of our training problems that seem so large, but are really so small, would be eliminated. Have you ever noticed the time and place designated for such subjects as field sanitation and civil administration? To the men, dull subjects at their best, and yet it always seems that these courses are held at high noon, immediately after chow, when full bellies and hot sun lull the men into such a stupor that they wouldn't care if the instructor were Marilyn Monroe.

As for drill, when is it always held? Why naturally, first thing in

the morning while the men's minds are still alert and fresh. Why not have them drill in the afternoon? Then they can't fall asleep. They either march or fall on their face. And speaking frankly, I like my face the way it is without a few improvements that concrete pavement would add to it. Now, you scream, "It's too hot to drill in the afternoon." Was it too hot on Guadalcanal or Tarawa? Was it too hot in Korea when the men fought so hard for lumps of landscape called Bunker Hill and The Hook? Besides, many doctors say that it is good to take a stroll to work off a heavy meal.

Hundreds of training manuals are printed each year that expound mightily on the how, where and when of the technique of instruction, but that is as far as the plan goes. No one actually does anything. Usually this is because many unit commanders simply shrug and say, "I have neither the time nor the place for all this fancy stuff. Besides, we're getting along fine just as we are." This is, indeed, a poor attitude for any unit commander to have. The time is *now*. The place is wherever he happens to be. The instructors and leaders he so sorely lacks are in his own unit — sleeping in his classrooms.

Let's crack this "big picture" problem of his and really see what the trouble is.

Let's start with the instructors, those key men who are so vital to the vast machinery that makes the Marine Corps tick. For one thing, who are the key men? Where do they come from and how do they find their way into the positions of prestige that they now hold? The manual states that all officers and NCOs have a dual role of leader and teacher. In some cases this is very true, but in many other cases this is a downright joke. In Marine Corps schools it is a practice that every man must assume different roles of responsibility so that he can see and learn the function of each.

A wise and valuable practice. If this method is so outstandingly good in the field, then why couldn't it also be applied in the classroom? For a man has to spend many hours in the classroom long before he goes to the field. I say make every man an instructor, from the private to

the general. Have you ever noticed in schools where the students are required to give short lectures or demonstrations as part of the curriculum, the sharp attention, the earnestness and sometimes amazing techniques of instruction that crop up from men we never knew existed? You cry for key men and you beg to have them transferred to your units. These key men are not in some other unit. Other officers are not blessed with their sacred presence. They are in your units. They are the same privates, corporals and sergeants that we find sleeping every day in every classroom in every unit of the Marine Corps. Give these men a chance. Let them wake themselves up!

Upon receipt of the training schedule, assign men, any men in your unit, the duty of preparing a complete lesson plan of the course to be given. Require that they turn in their prepared lesson one or two days prior to the scheduled time of presentation. This will give you time to examine the lesson plans and to hold a critique with these men individually and go over with them their good and bad points. Select the best. Make it a privilege, not a sore duty, to give a lesson.

I know many people will say that this will not work. Once, while stationed with a guard company, we had a young 2d lieutenant who adopted this policy. With the foreboding of all Marines for 2d lieutenants, we discreetly began chuckling up our sleeves. "It will never work," we said, but it did. It was in this guard company that I received, I think, the most valuable and complete training that I have ever received anywhere in the Marine Corps today. We used no magic formula, we simply carried out the procedure outlined for the technique of instruction found in training manuals gathering dust on the back row of our book shelves.

Perhaps you are fortunate enough to have a training aids library on your post. Now, I ask you, have you ever been inside the place? Truthfully, now, I'll wager you'll have to say "no." Well, if you haven't been there what makes you think your NCOs have? Why not, on some afternoon, gather your squad leaders and platoon sergeants and take a field trip to visit the library. The man in charge, I'm sure, will be most happy to give your men a guided tour through his castle and domain. Many men don't realize that some training aids exist. Go today, perhaps you'll find something you might be able to use tomorrow.


But supposing you're only a small guard detachment and have no training aids library. When I first began beating my gums I said that men are needed to win wars. By the same token the same men are needed to make training aids. I have never yet been to any unit, no matter how large or small, that I haven't found



Dull subjects — dull places

a few men who could draw, saw or hammer. Once I read in a gripe column the sad lament of a sergeant who claimed he had no blackboard. Like all the rest of us, he calmly leaned back in his swivel chair and asked why headquarters didn't give him one? It's a sad day, indeed, when Marines can't make out for themselves. Take two locker box tops, some paint, a piece of sandpaper, a man and presto — a blackboard.

On almost every post there is a hobby shop. In it one will find band saws, jig saws, table saws, little saws and big saws. What more blessing



A few boards and some paint

The Gunney gives the report, salutes are exchanged, and then . . . the bombshell. With a calmness that would put an angel to shame you blithely step forward and announce that today the machine gun platoon will become the 1st platoon and the 1st platoon will take over the machine guns and operate them. The 60s will become the 2d platoon and the 2nd platoon will become the mortarmen.

Egad! Gasps of astonishment.



Riflemen will take over the machine guns . . .

could a man ask? Imagine for yourself, a small but complete training aids library in your own company that has scale models of mortar shells, artillery shells, hand grenades, rifle grenades and rocket shells, all sawed neatly in half and painted to show the inside details. Imagine contour maps and fortified positions made like a small child's building block set. Imagine boards made to represent minefields, complete with barbed wire, trip flares, tank traps and Lord knows what all. Why man, there are undreamed possibilities for teaching lying about in blocks and sticks of wood! I have named just a few. If you sit down and think, you can add even more to the list.

Once in Korea, while attached to heavy machine guns, we started teach-

ing our men the method of firing heavy machine guns in defilade. We had one training manual in the whole platoon. To say the least, we were up a creek for training aids. Some large sheets of paper, colored pencils and a man who could draw and presto, we had all the training aids that we desired. Later, the whole battalion learned of them and was constantly borrowing them. As I said before, all the men need is a chance. Show them the way and they will be happy to go the rest of the way by themselves.

As for your work in the field, why not try this little bit of madness some day. Let's say that it is early morning and the company is preparing to take the field. Outside the company is formed and the roll is being taken. All is in readiness.



. . . gunners become mortarmen

The old man's flipped his lid for sure. Chaos and confusion.

Ah, but is it? Supposing you left one man with each weapon to act as an advisor? For the first time a rifle platoon begins to realize why their machine guns never seem to be able to keep up in an assault. They begin to realize that the mortarmen are good men packing weapons that deliver a wallop to the enemy anywhere within a range of 1,600 yards. The weapons platoon begins to see what a time the rifle platoons have. They begin to lean toward each other and to seek advice. Each learns the other's problems. Lo and behold, out of all the confused mess you had when you started, teamwork begins to take its hold.

I suppose by now you have all raised your eyebrows. "This fool," you say, "wants my men to become jacks of all trades and masters of none." Aha, now you have struck a sore point with me.

guard companies etc. It can be done! Make your own Aggressor teams.) The book says that the Aggressors should always lose. Why? Surely the Marine Corps has never won all their battles. Many's the time we've had a bloody nose. Why not take one of your platoons and assign them as Aggressors. Let them win if they can, and if they can, it will be a lesson brought brutally home to the men who lose. Don't hold your men down. Let them try any trick that comes to their foul little minds. If it doesn't work, then they'll know better than to try it next time. If it does work, then use it again, perfect it, shape it. Make it a part of your own company tactics. Once the men *close* with the enemy the book is thrown away. They have to use their own wits and their own quick thinking to stay alive or die.

And now you're going to tell me that all this is impossible. You'll sit and say that it takes many weeks to



*Starve me, run me, shoot me
but please . . . don't bore me*

or do you just make them that way? They say that a man learns 10 per cent of what he hears, 50 per cent of what he sees and 90 per cent of what he does. When do we begin to *do*? Next week, next year? Haven't your men had enough sleep yet, or are you waiting for a directive from headquarters?

Speaking for all enlisted men, I'm bored. How about getting me out of this rut? I can't move until you tell me to, you know! Likewise, I'm just naturally lazy. If you don't show me the things that I must do, then how can I know just what there is to be done?

For me you can take your big picture and run or something. I don't care what division is doing; I want to know when my squad moves out! Starve me, run me, shoot me, but don't bore me!

Give me a chance, Skipper, that's all I ask, just a chance. I'm just a little guy and only little things interest me. Come on down here and help me. I've got the paints, the oils and brushes. How's about getting together and let's paint the "little picture?"

USMC

Aggressors — let them win if they can

For the past few years throughout the Marine Corps I've heard men scream, "they can't put me in the infantry. I'm an aviation man, or a cook." Where on earth did these men get such silly notions? It has long been my understanding, and the Commandant's, that all Marines are infantrymen! A good carpenter must know his tools. Does he learn just the saw and hammer and then quit? Likewise for Marines. Should he learn just the rifle or the frying pan and stop there? If that were the case, what would happen to a company in the field if all their machine gunners became casualties? Should we throw away the guns or should we just sit and wait a few days until replacements arrive?

Once in a great while, we get to pit our strength and wits against an Aggressor unit. (Special note to

train an outfit to function in this way. Clown, thou hast eyes to see with but thou see'st not! The men *are* getting their training right then and there. Sure, they'll make mistakes, but mistakes are something that they will remember, and I'd rather have them make them in Camp Lejeune than on the shores of some God forsaken hellhole!

All these thoughts are "little pictures." Seemingly only small details, but aren't they, after all, the main thoughts that are in all our heads? In this one small note I could not begin to crack the "big picture," but I can pound on its front door. And you, the company commanders, the platoon leaders, the platoon sergeants—you are the ones that have the key to the door. You have the men. You have the time. Are your training problems really so big

Aviation Intelligence

If you'll buckle down, Winsocki, you'll find you like the job

• YOU'RE ASSIGNED THE AVIATION Intelligence officer's billet. Chances are that you're a pilot. You're not happy.

You don't even know what an Aviation Intelligence Officer (S-2) does, especially in a non-combat area. The S-2 duties there vary among units probably more than any other military job. That's the purpose of this article, to give you some helpful hints on what the S-2 does in a base area.

Broadly speaking, your job is to provide information, or more specifically, Intelligence (culled information) to the CO of your outfit and higher and lower echelons.

The tables of allowance make no provision for a cloak and dagger for the Aviation Intelligence Officer. You won't need them. In your particular job you will have a chance to collect much Intelligence without resort to under-cover methods.

One estimate said that 85 per cent of information on some WWII areas came from aerial photos. Requesting aerial photos is one of your babies in the field. The result can be highly interesting. One South Pacific photo interpreter spotted a Japanese air field under construction in a coconut grove at Munda. When the field was completed and the trees cut down, an allied air strike promptly put it out of commission. Not cloak and dagger Intelligence but just as interesting.

You may draw a CO whose orientation on Intelligence is such that he feels little need for it. It's up to you to make your job indispensable to him.

In combat the S-2 carries out the specific jobs outlined in directives and in the Intelligence standing operating procedure for his particular unit. Mainly they are concerned with briefing, debriefing (interrogation) and reports. Intelligence directives in combat areas are concrete and specific.

In a base or non-combat area the S-2 will find only part of his duties specifically mentioned in the unit's Intelligence SOP. Probably nowhere else in the military field can personal initiative be so important. It makes or breaks the Intelligence job in a base area.

Here are some secondary duties which may be assigned the S-2 in the unit's SOP:

1. *Security Classification Control.* You insure proper control and security of classified matter and see that classified matter is only given to those who need to have it. You ascertain that your procedures follow the policies found in the security manuals and directives from higher echelons. This means that you are the unit's counterintelligence officer. You keep would-be enemies from gathering Intelligence on your unit.

2. *Custodian of Classified Files.* You should continually examine your procedures to see if efficiency can be

improved in handling of classified matter. You take your checklist of duties from the *Security Manual*. You will prepare security clearances for personnel in your unit who must have access to classified matter.

3. *Public Information.* Chances are your own initiative will be the factor in the functioning of this responsibility. Check your next higher echelon PIO and develop a procedure which will insure a steady supply of public information.

4. *Historical and Intelligence Liaison Reports.* As historical officer you make a report every January and July on what happened in your outfit during the past 6 months. A current events log takes most of the strain out of this job. Important orders and documents which can be included as appendices or used as references should be logged as they appear so that you have everything needed at your fingertips when you sit down to write the report (according to the instructions listed in OP NAV 575.2 of 12 June 1951).

The Intelligence liaison report is due every quarter and gives you a chance to show just what your outfit has been doing during the quarter in Intelligence. It's short.

5. *Publications.* If you're publications officer it's up to you to make sure that there are enough maps and charts to go around "when the time comes." Keep an up-to-date inventory of maps.

Here are some things which you may not find in the Intelligence SOP but which are vital if you do your job:

6. *Training.* Not only must you

By Capt James R. Johnson

train the men in your section but everybody else who should know what the S-2 Section does (which includes just about the whole outfit). Make sure your aviation Intelligence clerks know how to fill out combat reports and make use of aerial photos and other Intelligence activities. Orient them on the functions of units you may be working with such as MACGS, MARTACRONS and MCCI squadrons.

7. *Files.* Know your Intelligence files thoroughly. The only way to do this is to go through them and acquaint yourself with what is in them, then if the colonel wants to know if you have the information on a certain subject it's "Yes, sir" or "No, sir." Know how the BID (Basic Intelligence Directive) filing system works.

8. *Liaison.* You've heard this word so much it has lost some of its effect. It's important when you get to know the people in higher, lower and adjacent echelons with whom you do Intelligence business. You stay up-to-date and are able to reciprocate good turns which expedite Intelligence matters.

9. *Channels.* Know where to send reports and where to send requisitions. This expedites matters too.

10. *Operating Equipment.* Know

how to run a movie projector, a slide projector, a baloptican, a "ditto" machine, a mimeograph, or any training aid your S-2 Section may have future use of.

11. *Recognition Training.* Pilots don't usually like recognition training in rear areas. It's up to you to make it interesting and regular.

12. *Reports.* Know what to put in each box on every report you may need. Saves learning when time is at a premium later and knowing the questions on the report form will speed debriefing of air crews.

13. *Briefings.* See what your CO thinks of a weekly world situation briefing for himself and his staff. Give briefings to everybody on security, Communism and subjects which come under your wing such as prisoners of war.

14. *Intelligence Annex.* Know how to prepare one. When your outfit runs its own problem you'll be writing one. See *USMC Staff Manual*.

15. *Ready Room.* See that the ready room is a place where the pilots like to be. Maintain a popular and technical reading library. Keep situation maps on all sensitive areas posted daily. Keep the charts on the walls neat and change them often. Make the speakers' stand the focal point of the room (don't have distracting photos and equipment near the speaker).

16. *Information.* Insofar as possible, keep yourself posted with both classified and unclassified information on the world situation. You are the man who "has the word" in the minds of every man in your outfit. Be prepared to give him an answer when he wants to know what the news is in any theater.

17. *Administrative SOP.* If your


Intelligence Section does not have one, write one. Put down in black and white each step in each process which goes on in the Intelligence Section. Then if your trained personnel are transferred suddenly new men can find out immediately what must be done to keep the Intelligence Section functioning. A good supplement to this SOP is a wall chart of the S-2 Section listing each man's duties (see MOS specifications in MOS Manual).

There are other ideas you'll pick up from the Intelligence officer at wing or squadron when you visit (liaison work again). Find out where he got that plastic relief map and the best way to expedite a roll of acetate.

Aviation Intelligence work is interesting. You are the one man in the unit who has the opportunity to keep posted on what is happening behind the scenes, world wide. The S-2 job will sell itself to you.


The higher you roll your sleeves in Aviation Intelligence work the more fascinated you'll become. Then, chances are, if you are a pilot assigned as S-2 you'll think twice before recommending in the Intelligence liaison report that someone send a ground officer around to relieve you.

US MC



Left — bridge located

Right — bridge destroyed



in brief



There were two high spots in the "Mel Maas Day" celebration held as a tribute to MajGen Melvin J. Maas (Ret'd) at Minneapolis, Minn last month.

One came for the general himself, when he was presented with a cigar humidor (above) by the Marines who were thoughtful enough to mount a braille translation of the inscription on the gift just below the plaque itself.

The other came for the Marines as the general stepped smartly along the ranks inspecting the honor guard formed for him (below). With a precision born of years of training the blind general came to a

halt in front of the third man in ranks, grasped the rifle and swung it neatly through the inspection routine.

It should be an object lesson to all Marines in the value of training and the niceties of custom and tradition, born of long years of loyal service.

Right—this is the AN/MPQ-10, the counter-mortar radar unit you've been hearing so much about.

Tested in Korea, this new electronic locator "locks on" to the path of enemy mortar shells automatically, tracks their trajectory and reveals the mortar's position.

These co-ordinates are then relayed to an artillery fire direction center which responds with counter-battery fire.

The equipment is compact and mobile and can be towed by a light truck.



Soldier, Gt Br

The British Army is losing its "voice." Regimental Sergeant Major Ronald Brittain (left, above) of the Coldstream Guards is retiring after 38 years of service.

The stentorian-voiced Brittain, who for many years was a British version of our DI, was recently heard informing a radio interviewer that a drill instructor should always place himself with the wind on the back of his neck—in order to insure maximum carrying power for his voice.

In his prime, it was said of RSM Brittain, that his voice, calling laggards to task, could be heard above the traffic of Victoria station.

The M-1 carbine, WWII weapon of officers, noncoms and specialists has permanently been eliminated from the Marine Corps' T/E for all units, posts and stations.



Because of the confusion among officers concerning outer garments, the 2 coats authorized by the *Manual* are shown below. The elastique topcoat, with a half-belted back and slash pockets (left) is required for those officers serving with a unit in which the troops are required to fall out in overcoats. For other officers, it is optional. The raincoat, M1950 w/liner (right) is a required item for all officers. The short overcoat, with roll-shawl type collar is optional. The confusing items are: the old overcoat (beaver or elastique w/ horizontal pockets) and the trench coat—both presently optional, but no longer authorized after 30 June 1956.





Marine Corps Gazette • February, 1955



"Let 'em sink," say the Engineers. Overcoming construction problems of the ice and snow pack of the Polar Cap, 2 miles deep in some places, the Army Engineers employed the submarine pressure-hull principle and built buildings of 18-foot tubes which are interconnected with passageways. The overall structure is balanced like a ship and designed to sink slowly on an even keel at the rate of several feet a year.

Entrance is gained through a hatch (right) not unlike the conning tower of a submarine. As the buildings sink into the snow, additional lengths are added to the hatches to keep them above the surface.



Convair

The new delta-wing Convair F-102A (above) is designed to fly day or night and in any kind of weather. It exceeded the speed of sound in level flight its second time in the air.

The end strength of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps for June 30, 1955 will be reduced by approximately 100,000 and the previously planned end strength of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps for 1956 will be reduced by 130,000. No change is contemplated in the present approved personnel strength of the Air Force.

Here is the breakdown on new future strengths by services:

	1955	1956
Army	1,100,000	1,000,000
Navy	665,000	650,000
Marines	205,000	190,000
Air Force	970,000	975,000

Commandant of the Marine Corps has announced that personnel reductions in the Corps will be

Marine Corps Gazette • February, 1955

LtGen G. C. Thomas, Commandant of Marine Corps Schools gave the program impetus recently (below) when he presented Post Sergeant Major Lewis L. Brown with one of the first new official sticks.

By combining all divisional supply and maintenance functions into a single organization, and by making other changes in combat support, the Marine Corps expects to produce more riflemen and other combat troops.

Under the completed setup, a service regiment will combine under one command what formerly consisted of a service battalion, an ordnance battalion and a motor transport battalion.

It is expected that the reorganization will enable the 3 Marine divisions to convert approximately 180 officers and 4,200 enlisted men from supporting roles into front-line troops.

accomplished over an 18-month period by curtailment of the recruitment and officer procurement programs.

All staff NCOs are encouraged to carry the official swagger stick as part of the service uniform when they are on garrison duty (except in formation with troops under arms) and on leave or liberty.



STRONG

By LtCol H. J. Woessner, II

✻ KOREA, SEPTEMBER 1951: "Enemy troops in Korea shut a second trap on allied units (on a patrol base) northwest of _____ after a battalion of United Nations forces had fought its way out of encirclement. . . .

"The second attack took place this morning when an estimated battalion of Communist troops attacked an allied patrol base under cover of haze and pre-dawn darkness. Latest reports said the UN unit was still surrounded.

"After yesterday's encirclement, UN fighter planes and infantry fought off Red troops long enough to free an allied unit surrounded on the hill.

"A regiment of Chinese Communists met with a battalion of allied troops with infantry, tanks and airpower. The UN force was for a time completely surrounded."

Korea, 1953: "Outpost _____ on the western front was captured by Chinese Communist Forces last night. The last message received called for friendly fire on the outpost position of the UN forces. All UN troops are presumed to be dead or prisoners."

Dien Bien Phu, May, 1954: "Outposts _____ and _____ of the Dien Bien Phu strongpoint have fallen. It is not known how long the strongpoint can continue to hold out."

These are just a few examples of quotations which could be found in the news reports or communiques of the fighting in Korea and Indochina. In Korea, units on outposts and patrol bases were surrounded and cut off, the enemy usually attaining sufficient numerical and fire superiority over the surrounded unit to

Marine Corps Gazette • February, 1955

ONGPOINTS ?

Limited in mobility, beyond effective supporting distance, outposts will fall easy prey to an enemy who uses mass as the key to victory

cause it heavy casualties and exposing the rescue force to probable ambush at the most vulnerable points along its avenues of approach. At Dien Bien Phu, the alleged strongpoint became a weak point for the same reason, until finally in this particular case the aerial resupply and reinforcements were rendered ineffective and defeat in detail became inevitable.

How and why has the enemy been able to achieve this tactical advantage? In many cases, it is because we have played directly into his hands by placing units in outposts or strongpoints wherein by mission, terrain or their own capabilities, they are limited to less initial or ultimate mobility or maneuverability than the enemy; and where they are beyond effective supporting distance of other friendly units.

We have placed units in this position repeatedly in spite of the fact that we credit the enemy with having the advantage of mass and that the enemy obviously considers the principle of mass as the key to victory; whether he applies it strategically to Korea or Indochina, or tactically to an outpost in Korea or a strongpoint in Indochina.

The result therefore is also obvious wherever and whenever we place a unit of ultimately limited mobility in an outpost or strongpoint, beyond effective support of other units, we expose it to defeat in detail. We can expect that the enemy will apply the principle of mass by establishing the necessary superiority at the right time and place to enable him to isolate and overrun our unit. We have learned this concept of his through bitter experience, and it is time for us to

avoid making the same mistakes again.

It has been stated above, that the factors of mobility and supporting distance are the principal ones in determining the ability of the outpost or strongpoint to maintain the tactical advantage. Briefly, the mobility or ability to maneuver is necessary to preclude encirclement and isolation; and the supporting distance must be such that a unit sent to assist can travel it in time to render effective aid and prevent defeat in detail. The size of the outpost or strongpoint and its firepower are important, too, and bear direct relation to the time available for maneuver or reinforcement. But these are the factors which the enemy application of massed manpower and firepower reduces to manageable proportions:

Before we go further, it should be made clear that the outposts, patrol bases and strongpoints that are being considered are not within the main defensive area, that is, as part of the outpost system in mobile defense or as strongpoints in the wide-front position defense. The outposts we are discussing are those in the security forces. The patrol bases are similar to outposts with the additional mission of conducting extensive patrols and will be considered synonymously with outposts. The strongpoints are those points outside the main defensive position organized for the all-around defense of a certain critical terrain feature, tactical locality, or communications center. The Dien Bien Phu strongpoint, for instance, was apparently organized not only for the defense of a communications center but also to invite attack.

We will first discuss the outposts in the security forces, which must have sufficient mobility to allow them to withdraw and avoid encirclement. Next we will discuss the strongpoints outside the main defensive position, whose mission and organization are such that mobility is usually sacrificed and which, therefore, must be within supporting distance of adequate forces available for their assistance.

Let us consider the mobility of outpost forces, then, as it has been affected by mission, by terrain or by the outpost units' own situation. First, what effect may the mission have on mobility? If we visualize the security forces, we see that from their locations forward of the battle position, aviation (assigned for the purpose), the advanced covering forces, the general outpost, combat outpost and local security have the normal mission of:

1. Providing early warning of the approach of hostile forces,
 2. Providing time for the main force to prepare for combat,
 3. Forcing early deployment of the enemy,
 4. Deceiving him as to the exact location of the main battle position, and
 5. Observing the enemy's advance.
- (FM 100-5)

Parts (1) and (5) of the mission would appear to have no effect on mobility. However, parts (2), (3) and (4), when applied to a general or combat outpost, may require a degree of immobility depending on the amount of time required for accomplishment. For instance, part (2) may mean that in a certain situation the general outpost is required to delay the enemy for 48 hours



Terrain—must work to our advantage

while the battle position is prepared. The degree of mobility will then depend on the length of time that the outpost is forced to defend on any one position. Consequently, we may deduce that this time factor in the mission has a direct relation to whether or not the outpost will become engaged in close combat in the defense of a position and become subject to loss of mobility and subsequent isolation and destruction by enemy mass, unless sufficient aid is made available.

Therefore, the first point we must remember about the mission is that the *time* of delay imposed on the outpost may have an adverse effect on its mobility, with a correspondingly greater risk of its destruction. Normally, the "time of delay" considered in conjunction with the outpost units' mobility should be such that the outpost can accomplish its mission without being forced to accept close combat.

If you refer to the quotation with the dateline, "Korea 1953," you will find a result typical of what the enemy will be very happy to arrange with the help of the commander who orders his outposts not to delay for a certain limited time, but to *defend at all costs*. Why did we do it in Korea?

These are some of the answers we hear: "To hold the ground pending a truce settlement." "Because we were ordered to." "To protect the

MLR." "To hold critical terrain." "To protect our MSR from observation." "To stop enemy creeping tactics." "To avoid having to recapture the ground from the enemy." "To use the ground as a patrol base." "Marines don't give an inch."

These and many more could be listed and they could be answered one by one. There may be an

element of truth in each, but the important thing to realize is, that none of the answers, with the exception of "because we were ordered to," is adequate reason for assigning a mission to an outpost of holding at all costs. It should be painfully clear that we are playing right into the enemy's hands if we so immobilize a unit and make it more convenient for the enemy to establish sufficient superiority to defeat it in detail.


Those brave troops who have executed "hold at all costs" missions against enemy attacks on outposts have the first right to judge the concept since they have been associated with it and survived. However, *all* of us must now revalue and re-estimate the situation in light of lessons learned. If the results of such an evaluation so indicate, it must be clearly and unequivocally stated that the concept of assigning "hold at all costs" missions to security outposts is not sound. In the future, outposts should then be given a mission including a "time" factor consonant with that contained in the reference from *FM 100-5*, and the battle position will be given the mission of defending at all costs.

The next consideration we have mentioned in connection with mobility is the terrain. Obviously, ter-



Time of delay—must not impose isolation and destruction

rain affects the mobility of each side, friendly and enemy, and we must make the terrain work to our advantage and to the disadvantage of the enemy. However, the important thing to determine is the comparative analysis of capabilities for mobility on any given terrain under any conditions of visibility. If we are fighting in mountains against an enemy whose soldiers are all skilled mountain climbers we must




Mobility—troops must be able to move under fire

realize that the enemy troop mobility will be greater than ours. Therefore, terrain has a direct bearing on the distance of the outpost from the battle position. If we are fighting over terrain which gives the enemy a relative advantage in mobility, we must insure that the distance forward of our position, at which the outpost is ordered to operate, is not so great that the enemy can maneuver sufficient strength between the outpost and our main forces, to isolate it from reinforcements and

immobilize it for subsequent defeat in detail.

In mountainous country such as that in Korea, as the number of critical terrain features increases in depth between the battle position and the outpost, the risk of that unit being surrounded in position and/or during a delaying action, increases correspondingly. If the lateral frontage for which an outpost is responsible is such that it cannot be observed during a day's patrol activities, it will be relatively simple for



Support—within effective supporting distance

an enemy, adept at infiltration and movement at night, to envelop the outpost with a numerically superior force and establish ambush positions to hinder the advance of "rescue" forces, or the withdrawal of the outpost.

If the outpost employs vehicles, and if the road net is restricted as it is in Korea, then the enemy's probable action becomes more obvious and his task becomes easier. He may organize his position in strength anywhere along the road's corridor but preferably at a narrow defile or pass, knowing that we will attempt to move our vehicular column in either or both directions through the area. If this enemy effort is made in conjunction with his major offensive, which after all may reasonably be expected, we may find the situation deteriorating to the point where all of our available forces will be required to defend the main battle position. Then the outpost will very probably be overrun and defeated in detail.

An illustration of how the enemy in Korea was thwarted in his attempt to sever the line of communication between a patrol base and the battle position was that of the 7th Marines in May 1951.

The 7th Marines (Reinf) were ordered to seize and establish an ad-

vanced regimental patrol base below Chunchon on 6 May. The position was 14 road miles forward of the MLR. During the period from 7 to 15 May, tank-infantry teams succeeded in patrolling as far as 25 miles forward of the patrol base, and they captured prisoners from four separate CCF Armies (Corps). By 15 May, prisoner interrogation, air observer reports and patrol contacts of other 1st Mar Div units on the left, and of the 2d Inf Div on the right, indicated that a considerable number of enemy had crossed south of the Soyang River on the east, and of the Pukhan River on the west of the 7th Marines' patrol sector.

Because of the recommendation of the 7th Marines, and the fortuitous application of the information as obtained to the study of enemy tactics and the terrain, the 3d Bn, 7th Ma-

ever, they were caught completely by surprise and repulsed with heavy losses. The plan to cut off the patrol base in this case was defeated, but the timing was very fortunate. Other units have not taken advantage of the lessons we must learn about the application of enemy tactical doctrine to terrain.

The last factor affecting mobility is the situation and capability of the outpost unit itself. We must consider the means of mobility available to the outpost, such as wheeled vehicles, LVTs or helicopters, and their capability of movement under fire; the effect on mobility caused by the enemy forcing the outpost to engage in close combat, either by surprise attack or after having isolated it by heavy fire; the effect of having wounded to evacuate; of having to move through passages in mine fields, wire and other of our

bined with mobility, to out-manuever the unit in preparation for its isolation and destruction)—then in order to prevent the unit's loss, we must render it timely assistance. The "timely assistance" must be capable of regaining the tactical advantage or else it, too, may be subject to defeat in detail. If, for instance, the enemy considers that the time and place of combat is to his advantage, he may in turn, reinforce his attack and attempt to defeat our forces in their piecemeal commitment. We may be forced to make a major effort then, to salvage what we can of our initial unit and the reinforcements, or be forced to accept their defeat. This latter is apparently what happened at Dien Bien Phu, where attack was invited and disaster came.

If, however, we start with the assumption that we have sufficient force to defeat the enemy in any one area, then we must be prepared to employ this force, manpower and/or firepower, to the extent necessary to allow the extrication of the outpost or strongpoint unit—either by neutralization or defeat of the enemy. The outpost or strongpoint, then, should be situated within such a distance of this available manpower or firepower that it can be brought to bear in time to avoid defeat in detail. Thus we see that *time* is of the essence and two elements are paramount: the *time* which our forces can delay the enemy establishment of superiority by application of fire and maneuver; and the *time* it takes for the reinforcements or support to become effective.

The time of delay by the outpost or strongpoint is dependent primarily on firepower; since, if the ability to maneuver still exists, conceivably the unit could return to the main position and reinforcement would not be necessary. Theoretically, therefore, the time of delay is proportionate to firepower. In the case of the supporting force, however, time is based on firepower and mobility. Mobility, in turn, depends on the terrain, the means and the capability of moving under fire against the enemy's isolation and interdiction efforts—which can be expected.

One example of how the Chinese
Marine Corps Gazette • February, 1955



"Dagmar"—temporary isolation by fire

rines and the regimental headquarters were ordered to displace to a critical mountain pass on the one road between the Division MLR and the 1st and 2d Battalions, remaining on the patrol base. The last elements of the 3d were in position at the pass at midnight on 16 May; at 0255 on the 17th, the pass was attacked by a CCF regiment. It was apparent that the CCF had expected to occupy the position without difficulty, in order to sever the line of communications; fortunately, how-

own defensive barriers. As each, or a combination of these considerations adversely affects mobility, the unit becomes more vulnerable to defeat in detail.

Now that we have thought briefly of the importance of mobility to an outpost, let us study the problem of supporting distance. If, in spite of everything that we have done to provide strength, firepower and mobility to an outpost or strongpoint unit, the enemy applies his mass of manpower and/or firepower (com-



"Hagaru" — support arrived in time

Communist Forces in Korea attempted to exploit this principle of mass against strongpoints, and of how it was defeated, was the Chosin Reservoir breakout.

The CCF attacked the 1st Mar Div when it was spread out in a series of strongpoints from Yudam-ni on the north to Chinhung-ni on the south, a road distance of some 30 miles. Each of these strongpoints was attacked almost simultaneously, in conjunction with attacks on Army units in the area. The bulk of the 5th and 7th Marines were attacked at Yudam-ni; Fox Co, 7th Marines was attacked at Sinhung-ni; the 3d Bn, 1st Marines was attacked at Hagaru-ri; 2/1 at Koto-ri; and 1/1 at Chinhung-ni. Further attacks were made at points along the adjoining MSR.

The CCF objective was obvious. By application of mass at each point,

they hoped to reduce each strongpoint to a weakpoint and defeat it in detail. Yet in not one of the major points mentioned above were they successful. First of all, because the firepower at each point was sufficient to delay the establishment of CCF superiority of firepower; and second, because the firepower and mobility of the forces as they rolled southward was adequate to insure that the support arrived at each successive strongpoint in time to be effective. The success of the 1st Mar Div would have been even more difficult to achieve, however, if the CCF had made a better estimate of the situation in the beginning. It is apparent that they over estimated their ability to reduce each strongpoint with their dispersed forces. However, if they had concentrated all of their forces against each successive strongpoint they may have had the

same success in the Chosin Reservoir area that they had elsewhere in Korea. The point to remember is, that although the Division was able to effect a breakout in that operation, such good fortune was not because of the superior tactical concept of employment of strongpoints, but rather to the superior combat ability of the units. Thus, the CCF estimate of mass requirement proved to be inadequate. It is only logical to assume that since that time the enemy commanders have revised their estimates and will insure that in the future they have the force available to apply the principle successfully. It would behoove us not to allow them opportunity to catch us in the same position again.

In summary we should reiterate; experience indicates that the enemy considers the principle of mass to be his greatest advantage and that its application is the key to victory. We must not play into his hands by ordering the establishment of out-

"The Hook" — firepower and manpower avoided defeat in detail



posts or strongpoints which have less mobility than the enemy. No matter how much mobility our units may have, they must be within supporting distance of a force adequate in strength and mobility to assure re-establishment of the tactical advantage, if it is lost.

It is important for us to realize these fundamental concepts of the employment of outposts and strongpoints not only because we may have to fight an enemy employing the same doctrine in a similar situation, but also because in the war of the future, using helicopters and atomic weapons, the same problems of mobility and supporting distance are emphasized. Therefore, we must plan our new tactics to avoid the old mistakes.

The Effect of Mobility and Supporting Distance on New Tactical Concepts

Our concepts of helicopter employment in an amphibious operation are shifting from the shallow helicopter objective with an early amphibious link-up force, to a deep objective with a later link-up force, to a very deep objective with no link-up force. The firepower is based either on atomic or non-atomic

weapons. The number of troops we think of as landing by helicopter appears to be shifting from a relatively small number to a larger number later and ultimately to the entire force. How do mobility and supporting distance enter this concept; how may that which we have discussed affect our future tactics?

There is no argument about the fact that the helicopter is a mobile vehicle. It has tremendous advantages in that it can take off from a ship at sea and land at a given point miles inland without regard to beach or terrain. The difficulty however, is its limited ability to move under fire. We can expect no helicopter operation to be successful unless we have effective air superiority and effective suppression of ground fire in the area. This is necessary whether we happen to be thinking in terms of moving troops into or out of an area. Therefore, we can say that the degree of mobility of the helicopter depends on the degree of air superiority and degree of suppression of ground fire. The degree of suppression of ground fire would normally depend on the amount of air cover for the operation, or the employment of mass

destruction weapons. It might be expected that either means, or a combination of both, could insure that the mobility of the helicopters could be exploited for a certain length of time to land the troops on an objective. After the troops have landed, the landing zone would then become similar to the Dien Bien Phu strongpoint and we might expect that the enemy reaction would be to attempt to reduce it to a weakpoint as discussed before. If we were to disperse these strongpoints for passive defense against enemy atomic weapons, the enemy effort would be relatively the same. In consideration of the link-up force and the depth of the objective, the same factors as discussed previously for the supporting force and supporting distance apply.

The implications of this concept should be plain. Its initial success relies on the ability of air and/or atomic weapons to insure the mobility of the helicopters, by preventing enemy air and ground fire from interfering with them. The mobility of the force after landing would be limited to that of foot troops and might be considerably less than that of the enemy. If helicopters were

The mobility of the troops on landing is limited to that of foot troops





cept that our helicopters must not be given an objective out of supporting distance of an armored link-up force, we would accept a severe limitation in the depth of the objective which we visualize for our future tactics.

Obviously, however, we must find, fix and face the facts. Unless we can insure continued mobility of our helicopters under all conditions, then we must realize that their employment must be within supporting distance of forces which we have described above as "adequate in strength and mobility to assure re-establishment of the tactical advantage if it is lost."

In order to plan successful tactics for the future, we must take advantage of the lessons of the past, and not view the weapons and equipment of the future as omnipotent within themselves. Their application must be based on sound tactics which are superior to those of the enemy.

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884—Future helicopter movement must be based on control of the air

used to move the troops in or out of the area, the same degree of air superiority would be necessary as was required initially. If this superiority could not be achieved and it became necessary to reinforce or link-up with the helicopter borne force, the supporting distance and corresponding time required by the link-up forces would be the major factor in producing success, and would constitute a considerable problem.

Therefore, we find that new tactical concepts depend even more heavily on the solution to the two requirements for mobility and supporting distance that we have often failed to provide in the past. To insure victory in the future, we must be sure that our solution is adequate. If for instance, we depend on air support, using either atomic or non-atomic weapons to suppress ground fire to allow initial employment of helicopters, we must remember that the mobility of the force is lost after the air support is lost or removed. In order to regain the mobility af-

forded by the helicopters, the enemy must again be suppressed. If however, the enemy weapons cannot be suppressed by non-atomic weapons, then our reliance on atomic weapons must depend on the range of the enemy from our forces. If they are too close to allow effective employment of atomic weapons without danger to our own force, we may find that we have lost the effective use of the helicopters, and in effect, lost our mobility. We would also have lost our ability to employ helicopters for carrying supporting forces to the immediate vicinity; although they could be used to land reinforcements as close as possible with the same type of air support as was available to the initial force. If this type of support proves inadequate to prevent defeat in detail we must realize that the mobility of the helicopters is insufficient. The supporting or link-up force may need an armored mobility to insure its capability of moving over the necessary supporting distance under fire. If we were to accept the con-



... we must take advantage of the lessons of the past

STAND UP AND...



By Capt George E. Shepherd

IF YOU WERE TO WALK INTO THE S-3 office one morning and find that you had been selected to give an hour talk to the battalion on some obscure subject with which you were only vaguely familiar, what would your reaction be?

Possibly your reaction would be similar to that of 2dLt Joe Schmo, who received just such an assignment not long ago. Upon receipt of the news, Schmo broke out in a cold sweat. His first thought was, "How can I possibly cram enough information into my cranium to hold forth before the entire battalion for a whole hour?" After he had calmed down a bit, and successfully resisted the temptation to punch the S-3 in the nose, he recalled from his observations of the instructors he had listened to at Quantico that there were three ways that he could present his material from the platform. He summed them up in his mind as follows:


He could prepare a well thought-out speech, with neatly turned phrases and amusing jokes at appropriate spots, and then read it to the battalion, a la Charles Laughton. But he knew from his experiences at Quantico that, unless he were another Adlai Stevenson, he would bore his audience to death before he reached the 15-minute mark. After some deliberation, he decided he was not a second Adlai Stevenson, so he turned to the second idea he had in mind.

He could prepare an enormous stack of notes from which he could constantly feed himself a stream of fresh ideas. This rather appealed to him but he realized that, in order to get at these fresh ideas, required constant looking back and forth from

TALK!

No need to get that lump in your throat

Read this—you can become a good speaker



his notes to his audience (with insufficient time for either) and in the process creating a distraction which would soon have his audience resembling spectators at a tennis match as they followed the bobbing up and down of his head. Schmo decided this was not what he wanted so he reached for his third idea.

He could get up and talk for an hour in a poised and confident manner, without notes, text, outline or any other crutch as he had seen a select few of the instructors do at Quantico. He knew that if he could do this, his audience would be interested; they would be hanging onto his every word because what he had to say would be interesting. People are made in such a way that they respond automatically to a well presented talk. Schmo decided without further ado that this was for him, but he asked himself, "How do I do it?"

Now it so happened that at this time it was National Brotherhood Week and this is the only explanation that could be found for the strange occurrences which followed the asking of this question. While Schmo was in deep deliberation over his problem, there appeared the ghost of the late great Col H. Clay, Ky., and he said to Schmo, "Son, the answer to your question lies in memorization." "But—, but—, but, sir, we don't memorize speeches anymore," Schmo gasped, when he had sufficiently recovered from the initial shock of seeing a real, live ghost. Whereupon Col Clay replied, "Memorization, not of words and sentences and paragraphs, my boy, but of *ideas*; the ideas necessary to ably present and adequately explain your subject." Having thus rendered

unto Schmo that which he so desperately needed, and in the process performed his good deed of the week, the Colonel withdrew in a cloud of gunsmoke, leaving Schmo to ponder the problem of how to put his advice into effect.

Schmo worked hard during the following weeks and carefully followed the advice he had received. Needless to say, when he gave his talk he was a great success and he was acclaimed far and wide as a *good* speaker. Even the local Toastmaster's Club was after him to join up. After that Schmo was looked up to as an acknowledged expert in the field of public speaking.

A week or so later I walked into the coffee mess for my morning cup of coffee and at a table over in the corner was Schmo, holding forth for the benefit of a small audience grouped around his table. As I drank my coffee, this is what I overheard.

"In preparing a talk for the Schmo method of presentation, the preparation falls into four phases. These we can title Study, Outline, Rehearsal and Presentation.

STUDY

The first requirement is to become intimately familiar with your subject. You cannot talk intelligently on a subject on which you are not somewhat of an authority. Your audience regards you as the final authority on the subject on which you are addressing them and you must be prepared for questions. The first question parried with a vague, "The book wasn't too clear on that point. I'll see if I can find the answer and let you know," and your stock starts down. It will continue its downward trend until you can



show your audience that you know what you are talking about.

Talk to other people about what you have read and of the ideas you have formulated to see if they make sense. Talk with people who have had experience in the field in order to get different attitudes and examples from actual situations. Read, talk, study and, by any other means you can think of, acquire a thorough background in the subject you want to talk about. This will give you a built-in reservoir of facts and figures which you can draw on when you start talking.

OUTLINE

Once you have an adequate background, you are ready for the next step—the preparation of an outline, or list of ideas. In thinking of what you need to say about your subject in order to adequately explain it you will find that there are 2, 3 or maybe even 4 main ideas, or categories, that you need to get across. The titles of these main ideas form the skeleton of your outline. For example, the subject, "The Division Military Police Company," breaks down almost automatically into 2 main ideas:

- I Organization
- II Employment

Then thinking in turn of each of these main ideas, you will find that in order to discuss them you must again consider 3 or 4 subordinate ideas in order to fully explain your subject. These subordinate ideas in turn break down into other essential points. This process of breaking each idea down into its principal subordinate ideas is continued until you have all the ideas necessary for a complete understanding of your subject listed in a logical sequence. A complete outline for a one-hour presentation might look something like this:

- I Organization
 - A. Company
 - (1) Organization
 - (2) Strength
 - B. Headquarters Section
 - (1) Organization
 - (2) Strength
 - C. Police Platoon
 - (1) Organization
 - (2) Strength
 - D. Traffic Platoon
 - (1) Organization

- (2) Strength
- II Employment
 - A. Prisoner of War Control
 - (1) Evacuating
 - (2) Processing
 - (3) Guarding
 - B. Straggler Control
 - (1) Straggler Line
 - (2) Straggler Point
 - (3) Straggler Collecting Point
 - C. Civilian Control
 - (1) Immobilization
 - (2) Evacuation
 - D. Traffic Control
 - (1) Traffic Circulation Plan
 - (2) Traffic Control Posts
 - (3) Escorts
 - (4) Patrols

REHEARSAL

With the outline completed, you are now ready to begin preparation to go on the stage. The first step is to memorize your outline—and you must memorize it so well that you can close your eyes and see a perfectly clear image of it floating in front of your eyes. You must be able to repeat it backward and forward. The ideas in your outline are your traffic signals, telling you where to turn, pause, stop and what to expect around each corner as you travel through your talk.

With this outline etched in your brain, you have a useful set of "handles" on which to hang the wide assortment of material you accumulated during the Study Phase. So now commences a process of sorting out the material in the "file" and hanging it on the appropriate "handles" of your outline. Review your notes and go over your material to see if you have enough on each idea to fully explain it to your audience.

You will soon discover that you can take any given idea in your outline and give a fairly intelligible resumé of what it's all about. Once you have reached this point, you are ready to stand up and start talking—but only to an imaginary audience.

The place where you do your talking is not important. It can be an empty classroom, the family garage, the bathroom or the bedroom. The important thing is to start talking *out loud* about your ideas. You will find that some ideas which look perfectly good on paper or sound perfectly wonderful when spoken silently, often sound incomplete or

garbled to the point of being ridiculous when spoken aloud for the first time. These must be revised and smoothed out. Tell your imaginary audience everything they need to know about your subject but—and this is extremely important—*don't look at your outline*. When you have finished, go to your outline and see what you have skipped. You'll miss some on the first go around, but probably not as much as you expected to forget. Run through it again. The second time over you will forget less. You will soon find that you have a great deal to say about each of your memorized ideas—not stiff, memorized stuff but information; things you just know from being intimately familiar with the subject, like a baseball fan talking about baseball, or an amateur James Melton talking about old cars.

PRESENTATION

Comes P-day, you'll no doubt greet your audience with quaking voice, trembling knees and forgotten jokes. Don't weaken—stay away from that outline! The first few words are the hardest. It might be wise to memorize word for word enough material to carry you through the first minute or two. By then that photograph you've drawn of your outline in your mind's eye will reappear, your confidence will begin returning and you'll soon be sailing in smooth waters. Above all, resist the temptation to peek at your outline during this critical period. Once you do, you'll find you are completely dependent upon it and can't leave it for a second. Keep thinking of your outline in the back of your mind and soon you'll be progressing from idea to idea without a hitch. Also, you will find that all your energy and attention is being devoted to the audience. You are looking at them *continuously* and you will find them returning the compliment. They will be sitting on the forward edge of their seats, listening, for what you have to say will be interesting. You will be giving them a series of ideas, presented in a logical sequence, completely and competently explained, and it cannot help but be interesting. In fact, it will be such a rare diet for them that they'll soon be calling you a *good* speaker.

US MC

REALITY

**The basic premise of democracy is philosophically incompatible
with the efficiency of a military organization**

✻ ... I READ WITH A GREAT DEAL OF interest the article *Morale*, by Major J. L. Tobin. While I do not agree with his selection of the word "morale" as the proper object of attack, I wholeheartedly agree with his sentiments. I remember with some bitterness the attitude of my fellow university students when I joined the Corps. At first they sympathized with me for having to go. When I told them I had volunteered they were shocked. Then they took the position that if I were not crazy, I was certainly eccentric.

I believe this attitude was picked up from the veterans of World War II who, in expressing their own dissatisfactions and frustrations, quite often painted an exaggerated picture. The impression they left was that military life is a confused, haphazard, dog-eat-dog sort of existence; that it is stupid and ineffectual; and that only a fool or a lover of totalitarianism would voluntarily become involved in it.

These feelings, which were expressed so repeatedly and which were seldom contradicted, seem to have overwhelmed the men who have come of age since World War II. This new generation of men, whose sentiments are based almost entirely upon the emotional reactions of their predecessors, currently find it popular to view the military with distaste and contempt.

I think the difficulty is this. America is a democratic nation; yet within this democratic framework exists an institution which is somewhat like an illegitimate son, namely the Armed Forces. A military organization is not democratic and by its very nature can never be democratic; but its existence in a democratic government is morally justified both because it is ultimately controlled by the people through their government and because it is essential to the continued preservation of that government. But where the basic

premise of democracy is that every individual is entitled to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," as long as he respects the rights of others; the basic premise of a military organization is that the purpose of every individual is to contribute to efficiency in combat. From a military point of view, the individual's life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness is strictly secondary and assumes importance only as it affects military efficiency. I am not trying to say that the welfare of the men should be ignored, merely that it is of secondary importance.

Because this basic difference between civilian and military life is so poorly understood by most Americans there is a tendency to compare military life unfavorably with civilian life when, in reality, as a way of life they should not even be competing. The Services themselves invite comparison by stressing the advantages to the individual: travel, adventure, a trade, security and retirement which are emphasized in order to place the Services in a competing position with civilian jobs.

Little or nothing is said of duty, loyalty, and patriotism—the very reason which should most influence a man's decision to enlist. At best, our recruiting policy is hypocritical, in that it lures a man into the Services under the guise of furthering his happiness and then jolts him with reality, making him feel victimized. At worst the policy is actually honest, and the Services become so concerned for the welfare of the individual that effectiveness in combat is slighted or neglected, resulting in a watered down version of military life which is mediocre both from a civilian and a military point of view. I have often felt that officers and

staff NCOs, many of whom know better, have corrupted themselves professionally, simply because they must in order to deal effectively with men who are still oriented in a democratic frame of reference.

I don't know that I have the answer to the problem, but I will offer a suggestion for what it is worth. The Services should undertake the job of educating the public regarding the nature of military organization by pointing out the differences in its aims and the aims of democracy, the role it plays in preserving democracy and the moral obligation of our young men to serve for a period of time in the Services. Duty, loyalty and patriotism may not have much popular appeal at first, but the popular reaction against the Services has no rational foundation, and sooner or later the public must face the reality that exists. When a man enlists or is inducted, he should be told straight from the shoulder what he is up against. That he is expected to place the needs of the Service above his own and that obedience to authority is the cornerstone of military organization. He should be sent to boot camp with the understanding that he is not only undergoing training and toughening up, but that he is encountering a test of manhood as well and is expected to face up to it. When he finishes boot camp, he should feel that he is accepted as a man and that he is capable of shouldering his responsibilities. If he is not fit, he should be weeded out and discharged. If a man feels that he is doing a man's job and that his worth is recognized by his fellow men, his morale will be high even if he is sleeping on the ground with an empty belly.

I sincerely believe that if the Services would adopt the role of a public conscience, taking a determined and uncompromising stand, they would profoundly influence public opinion.

US MC

By
1stLt Walter K. Wilson III

THE LAST DAYS OF



By Yoshitaka Horie

Picture taken Oct '42, in Canton while Gen Kuribayashi was Chief of Staff of the Army in South China

'I am working hard with many difficulties . . . under the present war situation I have been placed under serious uncertainty and tension . . . the enemy will surely invade this Iwo Jima. . . .'
So wrote the General, as he saw the handwriting on the wall

GENERAL KURIBAYASHI

✪ SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II, I was anxious to know the hidden details of the Iwo Jima battle, particularly about the last moment of General Kuribayashi.

I met some survivors who were captured by the American forces during the battle and were sent back to Japan after the end of war; and officers and men who left there just before the American forces landed.

Also, I was interested very much in the General's personal letters sent to his family from Iwo Jima. So I borrowed all the letters from Mrs Kuribayashi and translated them word for word into English.

It should be my great pleasure if this article would be read by the American Marines who fought on Iwo Jima.

The last moment of Gen Kuribayashi

From 2100 to 2130, on the 14th of March 1945, Song of Iwo Jima, composed by the fighting men of Iwo Jima before the American forces landed, was broadcast to the still-fighting officers and men from Tokyo. General Kuribayashi sent his thankful message to all Japanese.

On the 15th of March he informed Tokyo through Chichi Jima radio station as follows:

"I am determined to make 'Banzai' charges against the enemy at midnight on the 17th. Now I say goodbye to all senior and friend officers everlastingly." He added in this telegram his three farewell songs.

At 2300, 17 March, all officers changed their uniform into soldier's

or sailor's uniform and at midnight Gen Kuribayashi; RAdm Ichimaru; Col Takaishi, chief of staff; LtCol Nakane, operations staff and about 200 men, Army and Navy, went out of the Div Headquarters cave, leaving 50 or 60 men who had received severe wounds there, with one hand-grenade for each man for their suicide, and moved to a new cave about 150 meters northwest. During their movement under darkness, Gen Kuribayashi was wounded on his right thigh by an enemy shell splinter. One sergeant shouldered him and bound up his wound after they reached the new cave.

All survivors of the 145 Inf Regt, Tamanayama, Northern, Eastern and Western Districts gathered in the cave, totaling about 450. Among them about 150 men had been wounded.

The enemy besieged the cave, approaching it by firing and flame of tanks. On the 21st March the enemy started their advice for surrender by Nisei boys' voices through the loud-speaker.

The survivors continued fighting mainly by sniping. There was no food, no water for 5 days. The situation of the cave was very miserable. It was full of bleeding, groaning, weeping for friends' last moment, water-wanting for his last, mother-calling by some insane soldiers, suicide-committing and so on.

General Kuribayashi, sitting in the middle of the cave with Adm Ichimaru, had been encouraging the fighting men.

At the midnight of the 22nd

March, he asked LtCol Nakane how he can listen to Japanese voice in homeland once again in his life. LtCol Nakane looked around the cave and he assembled one small radio, infantry radio No. 5, turned switch.

All surviving and mobile officers and men except guards at all entrances surrounded the radio, concentrating their eyes upon Gen Kuribayashi. In Tokyo, at that time, they were announcing "Rokyoku," a sort of tragic story song.

General Kuribayashi who was listening to radio started weeping. Tears fell one after another on his face. Everybody was moved by emotion and wept. General Kuribayashi expressed in his tears his thankfulness to all officers and men for their faith, and apologized to them that he had ordered prohibition of having any pleasure and had forced them to fulfill the defense plan only. Also he apologized to them that he forced them to continue their fighting, instead of taking counterattack.

Around 0330, 23 March he took tearful leave of his officers and men, and he told them to conduct freely from now on, behaving themselves manly. He walked with cripple-legs, out the cave under darkness. Then LtCol Nakane and three men followed him. He could fortunately reach an enemy's sentry near by the loudspeaker without any fight. Several American soldiers gathered there. He talked with one of them in English, probably about the surrender of surviving members. Of



course the enemy did not know who he was.

He came back to the entrance of his cave and he had a violent argument there with LtCol Nakane. It seemed to other following men to be the argument concerning the surrender of the survivors, and a key-point of the argument was whether it was more important the living for history-making or dying for honor-keeping.

After about three minutes they looked to come to the conclusion. It was indeed in the grey of the morning of 23 March 1945. Then LtCol Nakane told other men to go back to the cave. General Kuribayashi sat down facing towards Tokyo and bowed three times, speaking some solemnly. Then he undressed until he could see his stomach and cut it by his knife, when LtCol Nakane who was standing to assist his "Harakiri" behind him, cut off Gen-

eral's neck by his sword. (This assistance for "Harakiri" was a custom of Japanese old soldiers.) He buried the General's corpse, went in to the cave, talked with Col Takaishi a few words, and then he took leave of Adm Ichimaru and went out of the cave. Lieutenant Colonel Nakane's corpse was found 10 minutes after he left the cave at just same place where Gen Kuribayashi died. He had shot his head by his pistol.

One sergeant assigned to the Signal Corps of the 109th Div walked out of the cave with Adm Ichimaru. Both of them had about 10 hand-grenades with them and advanced towards the enemy. There were many crowds of the enemy, but nobody noticed them and they walked and walked unconsciously through the enemy's crowds. The place where they went might be "Minamiburaku." There were many American vehicles. They threw the

hand grenades against the vehicles, causing some damages. It was the afternoon of the 23rd of March that the sergeant became awake and found his wounded body under the condition of receiving the medical treatment by the American Marine Corps.

Chief of Staff, Col Takaishi, kept the death of Gen Kuribayashi secret, ordered the radio men to communicate all latest battle news, ordered them to break the wireless after they communicated the latest words, "To all friends of Chichi Jima, Good-bye," and killed himself, shooting his head by his pistol in the afternoon of the 23rd of March 1945.

Letters from Gen Kuribayashi to his family

(The italicized interjections are those of Maj. Horie. Ed.)

Letters to wife dated 2 Aug 1944

I am glad to write you a letter, although I have no serious business today. I guess all members of my family are strongly living under the greatest war we ever had. Tako-chan (*second daughter, 8 years old*) would have gone to Hiaku (*130 miles west of Tokyo*), Nagano Prefecture, for school girl dispersion to avoid the enemy's air raids. I am afraid she might be sad, parting from her parents. On the other hand Taro (*first son, 19 years old*) and Yoko (*first daughter, 17 years old*), might be able to live by themselves under any difficulties.

I am working hard with many difficulties on Iwo Jima. Under the present war situation, I have been placed under serious uncertainty and tension. The enemy which captured Saipan and are now attacking Guam will surely invade this Iwo Jima enroute to the mainland of Japan, and the time of their assault will be very soon. There is a big difference between this island and Raboul where Gen Imamura stays now as Commanding General and already was by-passed by the enemy. He will be able to out-live there. We would never have any chance to escape death. I have heard that Mr Yanagida (*a friend of Gen Kuribayashi when he was Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army in Canton, Southern China*) told you that the enemy's air raid was not so dangerous. It was true in Canton when we stayed there, but the American bombardment over here is absolutely different. You will not be able to understand the true situation by hearing somebody's story. I believe you heard from LtCol

Personal history of General Kuribayashi

Personal History of General Kuribayashi

1891 Born as second son of Tsurujiro Kuribayashi, old soldier's family, Nagano-Prefecture	1931 Sent to Canada as the first Military Attache
1911 Graduated from the Nagano High School	1933 Lieutenant Colonel
1914 Graduated from the Military Academy	1933 Came back to Japan from Canada. Worked at War Department
1914 2nd Lt, Cavalry officer, assigned to the 15th Cav Regt	1936 Regimental Commander of the 7th Cav Regt in Hokkaido
1916 Graduated from the Cavalry Officer's School	1937 Colonel
1918 1st Lt, assigned to the 15th Cav Regt	Chief of the Horse Administration Section, War Department
1920 Entered the War College	1940 Major General
1923 Captain	Brigade Commander of 2nd Cav Brig
1923 Graduated from the War College. Awarded a sword by the Emperor Taisho due to excellent marks	1940 Had operations in Northern China, commanding the second Cav Brig in 1940 and 1941
1923 Company commander of the 15th Cav Regt	1941 Chief of Staff, Japanese Army in the Southern China
1925 Assigned to the Military Education Department	1943 Lieutenant General
1928 Sent to the United States for study of the military	Commanding General of the Tokyo Division
1930 Major	1944 Commanding General of the 109th Division
1930 Came back to Japan from the United States through Siberia. Assigned to War Department	Sent to Iwo Jima
	1945 General as of 17 March 1945
	Died on Iwo Jima on 23rd of March 1945

Nishi (Baron, and was Olympic champion of the equestrian steeplechase. On Iwo Jima, commander of the 26th Tank Regt. He went to Tokyo by air to get tanks at the end of July 1944 because all of his tanks were sunk by the American submarine attack near Chichi Jima at the beginning of July 1944, and LtCol Nishi was picked up by an escort destroyer and he stayed one night at my bedroom at Chichi Jima) who went to Tokyo for a while the other day about the enemy's air raids on Iwo Jima, but it is no exaggeration to say that he might not be able to tell you the real situation.

I have heard that the people's daily life in Tokyo looks like beggar's life because of shortage of commodities, but even that in Tokyo will be level of some aristocracy of wealth when compared with our life.

We have to save water here very urgently because we have no well and no brook and only way to get water is to save rain in bottles or pots. Every morning I get some water in a rice bowl from a bottle and wash my face. After I wash my face, Lt Fujita, 2nd Adjutant-general washes, then my orderly washes. As soon as all of us finish face-washing, I get the water in a small can and keep it for our toilet. Even this way can not be had by general soldiers or sailors. After my front-line inspection finishes every day I, with sweaty body, heartily want to get a cup of cool water, but of course I can't do it.

There are many flies and small ants. The flies come into my eyes or mouth and hundreds of ants climb up my body. Also many grotesque and dirty worms are here. We call them "cockroach." However, it is fortunate for us that there is no snake and no venomous insect.

There were some wild papaws and bananas on this island, but no more now. Iwo Jima is new volcano island, therefore this island produces few vegetables.

There were some residents before I came here at the end of June 1944, but now no more civilians, and too many soldiers and sailors are gathering in flocks all over this island.

Ah! In comparison of this island with the operation theaters of the Chinese continent, the continent was just like an oasis in a desert, and the battle in the continent was like a maneuver. There are many officers and men who have been in China and they say unanimously that China was very good.

All officers and men are determined that they must have same fate as that of the members on Attu and Saipan. Therefore, their faces look sad and we cannot see their smiling. It is same with me. All the time except my sleeping



Kuribayashi's Iwo Jima

time, I am thinking of my last moment. Even in my sleeping time I dream about it many times. The other night, I dreamed that I went back home, you and Takako (second daughter) were very glad to see me, but as I told you that I just came back home for telling my will to you and had to go back to Iwo Jima, Takako looked very sad. One more dream was this: When I went to a village shrine of my native country for worship, already you and Takako were waiting there and I was surprised.

Well, open my military trunk which was taken back to you by LtCol Nishi and check the containing stuffs. Particularly, sterilize all stuff in order not to allow the worms to propagate themselves at my house. Take out some sweetened bean-jellies from the trunk as soon as possible.

I believe that nothing of my properties will be sent back home in the case of my death. So I want to send back most of my properties, leaving here only daily necessities.

I am thinking how to deal with the dispersion of my house. In my opinion, Tokyo will be bombed by the enemy one month after the fall of my Iwo Jima. Therefore, I think the best way for you is to move to Nagano Prefecture. Chibacity and Inage city, both 15 miles south of Tokyo, will be the landing place of the enemy for their capture of Tokyo. The war situation has come to the critical time that we have to think of the enemy's invasion against the mainland of Japan. I suggest that you go ahead to move to Hiaku, Nagano Prefecture. It is important to make difference between the daily necessities and luxuries, when you adjust the household properties. Of course it might be a good idea to send all properties with one chartered train. You can sell whiskeys and cigarettes, but if Taro can not quit smoking it is all right to keep cigarettes for him.

Let me close for this time. Take it

easy, please. Oh! I will send some money, my salary for June and July to you. The paymaster told me that my salary would be paid to you after September 1944.

I don't write to my children, today.

Very truly yours,

Tadamichi

Letter to wife dated 9 September 1944

I want to write mainly about the enemy's air raid today. It might serve as a reference for you if Tokyo was raided.

Firstly, the enemy aircraft in various formations composed of 50 or 80 which took off from their aircraft carriers cruising near Iwo Jima come to bomb this island, firing their machine guns against any targets. As soon as one formation finishes the bombing and firing for about 30 minutes or one hour, another formation comes. Our antiaircraft guns and machine guns shoot these aircraft, but it is very difficult to shoot down them because their speed is very fast. All our members except the antiaircraft troops get into the air raid shelters during their bombardment. The air raid shelter is very nice and there is few of straight shot. Following their air raids, they send warships and fire their naval guns. The naval gun fire gives us more casualties than air raid. By these air raid and naval gun fire, any and all of the Japanese visible houses have been completely destroyed. The housing areas called "Village" were burnt to the ground.

Secondly, big bombers come from Saipan. The air raids from the aircraft carriers used to start in the early morning and quit a little time before nightfall. But the big bombers come to attack us at any time. Recently one or two aircraft come just before dawn or just after dusk. The air raid from the aircraft carriers are very violent but it does not last so long time, however, the

bombings by the big bombers are very nervous.

I guess that their bombing against Tokyo will be started by the big bombers and then the air raids by the aircraft carriers will come.

Even at night we can never take off our uniform and we have to be ready to get into air raid shelters at any time when we hear the air alarm. Therefore, we are living in small temporary cottages or tents built close to our shelters. We take our evening meal before dusk. If they start their bombing against Tokyo, you have to be ready to get up at any time from your bed and you had better carry your money-bag, some food and water into your shelter. Children might think much of their books, but tell them that some food and tea are more important than the books.

I have many things to write, but our aircraft for Tokyo will leave here very soon, so I have to close for this time.

Very truly yours,
Tadamichi

Letter to Taro (Son) dated 10 October 1944

Very glad to receive your letter. It will be true that Japan must have help of students for the supply service of the Army and Navy. However, the study at school is more important for your future. You have to make every effort to train your body and foster your scholarship. Japan has come to the turning point



to get ruin or prosperity now, therefore, you should do your best for your mother country also for your house. I know you did not do anything for your house before, but as now the time is very critical and particularly your father is



overseas and no more housemaid also your mother is not so healthy, you have to work hard, helping your mother. That is your responsibility as a man.

Especially, the war situation becomes worse day after day for our country and the life of your father is just like a flickering light before the wind. Our fate will be same as that of Saipan, Guam and Tinian if the enemy assaults, and we can never expect returning alive. Please be the strong pillar of our house and live strongly overcoming any difficulties.

I think you have been bred in a hot-house and it is not good under the miserable circumstances. I wanted to give you severe Sparta-type training at home, but at that time you could not understand my real affection for you and you did not like the training. Very soon you will come to find what I am writing now. Please grow up mightily and honestly with my mind and your mother's affection and be a trustworthy man for Japanese society.

The selection of books you read is very important, and you had better quit smoking. Many soldiers who smoke cigarettes have now big trouble here due to difficulties of getting it. Lt. Fujita, 2nd Adjutant-general, who started his smoking after he became a salary-man is worrying how to get cigarette or how to quit smoking. If possible, you had better not drink wine.

At home, get along with mother and sister and sometimes joke for the comfort in their sorrow.

Very truly yours,
Father at Iwo Jima

P.S. You wrote big letters on every other line of the letter-paper. That is not good from the viewpoint of saving paper.

Letter to Taro dated 27 November 1944

According to your mother's letter you are studying and also working for the Army Supply very hard. That is very good and I am very happy.

I, your father, stand on Iwo Jima the

front which the enemy will assault very soon. In other words, this island is just entrance of Japan. My heart can be such as the heart of Gen M. Kusunuki who went to the Minao River to fight Gen T. Ashikaga 650 years ago. (*Gen Kusunuki was the commanding general of the Emperor's Army and he fought against Gen Ashikaga with his smaller number of Army at the Minato River and was killed there. He is a famous general in the Japanese history.*) Just like him I can not expect returning alive, however, I am very much honored and proud of fighting to death for my mother country.

Well, today is your birthday, and it is sensible for us because you became the age of 20. Up to date we had many troubles and pleasures upon your breeding, particularly your mother's effort was very splendid, especially because I was abroad so many times, for 3 years in the United States, 3 years in Canada, 1 year in Manchuria and 2 years in China. Now you might be able to judge many problems by yourself even without the help of your parents, but it is very important to have self-examination. It is nature that it is hard for you to judge yourself. Self-examination is the first step of man's culture. Strong will is essential for a man, and a man of weak will can not do anything. There are many cases that murder or some other heavy crimes are done by the men of weak will. There is a man who makes some faults, or can not execute the thing he thinks good, or can not improve the thing he thinks bad. That comes from weakness of his will. In conclusion "Will" is boss of a man, and whether or not a man becomes a successful man is decided by the strength of his will. On the other hand, I think you have not trained your will. If your will was weak you might be unable to be "good host" of my house.

I pray God on your birthday for your success in training your will and in becoming a great trustworthy man in Japan. Particularly you have to be the

foundation-stone of my house after my death.

Take it easy, Taro.

Very truly yours,
Your father

Letter to wife dated 11 December 1944

I am very sorry to hear that the winter has come in Tokyo and water is cold, causing chaps on your fingers. I deeply sympathize with you. I believe you had better wipe off any moisture after you use water and rub your hand with hand. Also I am sorry to hear that you can make bath only once every 10 days in order to save fuel. I understand that the present fuel situation in Japan is very bad in comparison with that in the last winter. I realize how it is bad for your body if you don't take bath, because I am suffering from dirt too much over here now.

I will write here my latest daily life:

I get up at 0530 (In my troops, some get up at 0400, 0430 or 0500, sometimes they work at night and sleep at day time), go to toilet, wash my face, swing my wooden sword for my health, take breakfast at 0630, inspect the front line from 0700 to a little time before 1100, take lunch at 1100, see the paper works of my staffs, inspect the front line or see the troops' maneuvers from 1400 to 1630, take supper at 1700, sing some songs or poems, go to bed at 1800 and start sleeping very fast because of fatigue.

Letter to wife dated 21 January 1945

I will make this letter's address "Hiaku," presuming that you already moved there. I think the first trouble you get there might be difficulty of getting food and fuels. If you moved to Nagano city or to Matsushiro city you might have not so many difficulties, because there are many relatives. But at Hiaku there is no relative, so I sympathize with you.

Did you leave Taro in Tokyo? How do you think about Takako? Even though the room you borrowed at Hiaku is small, I believe you had better take Takako in to your room. Changing of school is not good for her, but she will

be satisfied with her stay with mother and sister. If a part of the Tokyo Divisional Hqs moves to "Iwabushi," ask Col Itazu and get his help.

Well, the war will last long, and the enemy's attack will become more violent. I have an information here that B-29 which bomb Tokyo is calculated at Saipan now about 140 or 150, may increase up to 240 or 250 in coming April and 500 at the end of this year. Therefore, the bombing against the mainland of Japan will become severer and severer.

If Iwo Jima fell in the enemy's hands, hundreds of aircraft will be released for bombing Japan.

Probably the enemy will invade the shores of Kanagawa and Chiba prefectures and they will advance towards Tokyo. Listen to radio and read newspapers, and be careful in regard to the war situation, and do your best in reference to the situation.

The war in Philippines is very bad for Japan and I think the enemy would be able to come to this Iwo Jima at any time.

We officers and men of Iwo Jima have determined to do our best until the last moment and nobody has expected returning home alive. At home, never think that I would return home alive. Already I have written to you about my death over here. Therefore, don't be surprised by the news of my death.

Well, never show my letters to other members particularly to the newspapermen. Because my letters will become good materials for them.

I hope you find a small land for my grave and buy it. If you can get it in Tokyo it is good. If you can not find it in Tokyo, any place is all right. I know that my ashes will not be sent back, and my soul will stay in your body and children's bodies, but I think you want to have small grave to enshrine my soul.

Take care of your health and live as long as possible. Take care of children instead of me too.

Very truly yours,
Tadamichi

Letter to wife dated 3 February 1945

I have not received your letter for about 25 days. Anything happened? I think you might have caught cold.

How is your dispersion? Are you still staying in Tokyo? You had better believe that the enemy's bombing will become severer and severer, and it is good for you to go to some safe area. The possibility to be killed by the straight bomb might be few, but I am afraid it might happen that you would get hurt by the fire caused by fire bombs. Even over here the enemy drop the fire bombs, and they cause fire although there is no more material to be burnt. Sometimes they drop drums of gasoline, causing "Sea of Fire."

On Iwo Jima most of officers and men have suffered from disease, but I am very happy I have never suffered.

Today, Major Omoto, 1st Adjutant-general, goes to the Imperial Japanese Hqs. I am going to ask him to take this letter to you. He will go to his native town, Fukushima-city. Don't ask him anything to bring here.

Take it easy. Don't catch cold. Sometimes get masseuse's help in order to get recovery from your fatigue.

Tell Taro to have ruled life.

Now, as the mail-plane is going to leave here, I will close.

Very truly yours,
Tadamichi



On the 19th of February 1945, the American Marines landed on Iwo Jima. In those days Mrs Kuribayashi and Yoko (oldest daughter) went to one shrine close to their house in Tokyo every day to pray God for Japanese victory on Iwo Jima.

The War Department promoted LtGen Kuribayashi to General on the 21st of March as of 17 March 1945, and General of the Army Sugiyama, War Minister, went to Mrs Kuribayashi's house and handed over the writ of promotion. At Chichi Jima, I tried my best to communicate the promotion to the still surviving General by wireless on 22nd and 23rd of March, but probably in vain, because the wireless on Iwo Jima was hurrying too much to send their messages and did not try to receive our telegrams. USMC

These letters are published through the courtesy and consent of Mrs Yoshii Kuribayashi.



The present system is frustrating to both commander and staff officer



By LtCol P. L. Crawford
and Maj J. C. Stanfield

THE MARINE CORPS HAS BEEN known for some time as the military organization which obtains the maximum results with the minimum personnel or equipment. However, it seems that we might have reached or passed the point of diminishing returns in our staff organization.

Personnel studies in industry and in government have established the fact that no man can effectively supervise more than 7 subordinate supervisors and that he is not paying his way unless he has at least 3 subordinates working for him. Yet in our present Marine Corps staffs we have a system where we expect one man, our chief of staff, to coordinate and supervise the general staff and all the special staff, some 32 bil-

lets in a Force-level headquarters.

The immediate cry heard will be "This is not so, the special staff is coordinated by the general staff."

The general staff section head has no authority or responsibility for overall supervision of the special staff section's activities. In those instances where co-ordination and a degree of responsibility is exercised by the general staff section head, the special staff officer finds himself working for and answering to two bosses, both the chief of staff and the general staff section head.

This situation obviously does not make for a smoothly operating staff. The chief of staff should not and cannot be expected to efficiently direct and supervise the activities of 32 billets under him. Instead of having a staff organization where all subordinates are in effect equal until

the chief-of-staff level is reached, why not have a pyramid of gradually increasing responsibilities until the top is reached in an orderly and logical manner? To build this pyramid into a simple and flexible staff system with efficient procedures, we should tailor it to agree with present-day management techniques and concepts.

World War II with its complexities resulted in a need for more specialists and larger staffs. Unified commands with joint staffs became common among the Allies. Improved efficiency was attempted through various changes in staff procedures. The number of special staff sections increased but policy matters remained the prerogative of the general staff.

Since World War II, attempts have been made to achieve stand-

ardization of staffs as they have become more complex in keeping with the progressive scientific nature of war. The postwar trend in staff procedures has been toward greater unification of effort and reduction in the number of agencies reporting to the commander or chief of staff.

Within the United States, the Army has outlined its staff organization and procedures in *FM 101-5*. The system in use is adequate for the Army's use and is well planned and executed. It seems to be rather compartmented and comparatively inflexible, and not completely adaptable to Marine Corps use.

The Marine Corps has tried various modifications of the Army system. *Staff Manual, 1945* was published to illustrate procedures and to establish principles in effect at that time. Major changes in some areas of staff functioning were made in the 1948 issue. There has not been widespread acceptance of the 1948 *Staff Manual* and as a result, various systems based on it and on *FM 101-5* have been in use since that time. Some examples of variations between staffs are:

1. *FM 101-5* states that the adjutant will assign personnel. In some staffs the adjutant assigns personnel, in others the G-1 assigns them. In other staffs the adjutant assigns enlisted men and the G-1 assigns officers.

2. *FM 101-5* states that the adjutant will route correspondence. In some staffs the adjutant, in others the G-1 and in some the staff secretary (or a combination of the three) routes correspondence and/or messages.

Essentially, a staff should be organized as desired by a commander to aid him in carrying out his duties. The ideas of individual commanders vary just as the ideas of the officers on a staff vary. It is impossible to prescribe an adequate staff organization for every commander for every situation, but it should not be impossible to prescribe a standard staff organization which would be adequate for Marine Corps use.

The problem of prescribing a standard staff organization cannot be solved without first determining what a staff is to do and what the desirable features are. Briefly, the mission of a staff is to assist the com-




Figure 1

mander. Therefore, desirable features might be those which succeed in accomplishing the mission with:

1. A clear delineation of responsibilities.
2. A minimum of confusion in carrying out tasks.
3. The least number of personnel to carry out the required duties.

Proper staff organization can be undertaken by two primary methods, by organizing a completely new system or by modifying the present system. First, let us go completely off the deep end and propose a new staff system.

Before we start with this new staff organization, we need to recognize the primary duties of a commander and what his staff should do. We can probably all agree that here are two main divisions of a commander's duties. He must be able to employ his troops in the field and he must be able to support them there. Therefore, automatically we have operations and logistics. In addition, the commander must be prepared for continued operations, so we must

supervisors, the beginning of our revised staff chart develops as above:

In this organization the chief of staff would only be co-ordinating the efforts of 3 men; therefore, he would have ample time to carry out the various other duties of his position.

Now to further analyze this new staff, the job of the *Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations* shall be considered. As any officer who has done G-2 or G-3 duty knows, planning for an operation and the operation itself requires close co-operation of the Operations and Intelligence Sections. Actually, in many cases the Operations and Intelligence Sections operate from the same tent or office. Accordingly, in this new organization we have placed intelligence functions in the Operations Section. Another logical breakdown in this Operations Section is the provision of an officer who would be responsible for all supporting arms specialists. A very important operations assistant, especially in garrison, is the training officer. This gives a possible breakdown of the Operations Section as shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2

add planning to his duties. This results in the delineation of the 3 new General Staff Sections: i.e.; operations, logistics and planning.

Keeping in mind that one man should supervise a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 7 subordinate

The second section of our new staff is the one headed by the *Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics*. There are 3 main fields of endeavor left which logically come under his cognizance: the first being logistics itself, the second is the administra-

tive-personnel field and the third is communications.

Logistics breaks down into the 3 main fields of operations, supply and services. The present general and special staff members concerned with these 3 subjects would be placed under their logical heads.

The second assistant to the Dep

should be on a general staff level. While communications is normally considered as an operational field it is actually in the nature of a logistical service rather than operational supporting arm and should properly be placed under the logistics officer.

The abbreviated structure of the Logistics Section would be as shown

the ill. Therefore, the details of organization and realignment of the staff sections and of their functioning has not been attempted.

Chart 2 is a command chart of a staff under this proposed system which illustrates what was meant by a "pyramid of gradually increasing responsibilities." (Chart 1, present system, is shown for comparison.)

Now that the radical, redesigned staff concept has been presented and probably rejected by those members of the Marine Corps holding fast to the ideas of the "Old Corps," let us turn to something that may be more appealing to those steadfast believers in the past.

The second method of attacking the problem is to modify the present system so it will be more logical and more workable. Before attempting to modify the present system the causes for current failings should be determined.

Both FM 101-5 and the *Staff Manual 1948* present adequate staff systems. The fault is not in the organization of the staff but in the staff functioning. This functioning is faulty because of overlapping fields of responsibility and because of local modifications and interpretations of the areas of responsibility. The local modifications only serve to confuse the newcomers to a staff or persons from other organizations who must work with the staff. The poor interpretation is a result of a lack of definition within the Marine Corps of what constitutes co-ordination and supervision of special staff sections by general staff sections.

The staffs of the majority of Ma-




Figure 3

C/S for Logistics would be in charge of administration and personnel with duties similar to those now performed by the G-1. Close co-ordination is always necessary between personnel and logistics and the furnishing of personnel is no different in mechanics than the furnishing of supplies and equipment and is, therefore, a matter for the logistics officer.

The special staff section known as communications is, in this age of electronic and atomic warfare, growing into an importance closely approaching that of operations and logistics. It is not believed, though, that communications, which is essentially a support or service function,

above in Figure 5.

In this new type staff the *Deputy Chief of Staff for Planning* would have a small staff similar to the other two sections with either permanent members in all fields or additional duty members from the other sections assigned for specific missions.

This approach to the improvement of staff functioning is such a departure from the norm that the idea will probably appear infeasible. Also, the approach may be criticized as not being presented in sufficient detail to permit a critical analysis of the plan. The intent of this article is not to administer the cure, but merely to attempt a prescription for




Chart 1—the present system




Chart 2—the proposed system

rine Corps commands seem to have evolved into a command system within the staff. That is, the general staff officer responsible for co-ordination of several special staff sections is answerable to the chief of staff for the activities of those sections. As a result, the general staff officer is given instructions for the operation of the special staff sections and is expected to see that they are carried out. He must therefore, in effect, exercise command over special staff officers in addition to co-ordination and supervision. This being the case, and since it seems to be the desired method of operating, why not go to command 100 per cent and do away with the supposed co-ordination and supervision? This would eliminate the present confusing situation where both the chief of staff and the general staff officer attempt to direct and control the efforts of the special staff officer. At the same time we go to this command system of staff work let us see where consolidation of jobs is possible with little or no loss of efficiency.

To begin with, why not look at the previously mentioned variations in duties of the staff secretary and the adjutant. The staff secretary is the secretary to the chief of staff and routes correspondence to and from that office and other staff offices. He also maintains a temporary office of record. The adjutant also is concerned with routing correspondence throughout the headquarters and maintains the permanent office of record. Why have two routing systems and two sets of records and why have two billets with which to do the jobs? Why not do away with one or the other and eliminate du-

plication, confusion and extra personnel? The adjutant is the one to eliminate. Then all correspondence, messages and communications arriving in the headquarters would go to the head man of the staff, the chief of staff or his agent, who would take action or route it to the proper section. Likewise, the staff secretary could authenticate routine orders instead of the adjutant.

Now to get to the general staff. We have done away with the adjutant and given his routing, filing and authentication duties to the staff secretary. Let's give his personnel duties to the G-1 and the adjutant will be completely out of the picture. Where before both the adjutant and G-1 were concerned with personnel, postal and administrative duties, we now have only one man responsible

and other miscellaneous duties which are normally concerned with individuals. We will come up with subsections as follows:

1. Personnel (Clfn & Assgmt)
2. Administrative
3. Postal
4. Civil Affairs (Mil Govt)
5. Legal
6. Chaplain
7. Hq Comdt
8. Inspector
9. Provost Marshal
10. Information Services
11. Special Services

Remembering that we don't want more than 7 agencies reporting to a single person, let's see where we can combine similar G-1 functions in an efficient grouping. A combining of related duties would result in sections as follows in Figure 4.




Figure 4

for these activities.

To pursue this further, let's place in the G-1 Section all functions concerning personnel as individuals

The G-2 Section is an entity at present so, other than divorcing Information Services from it, it can remain as is.

The G-3 Section is rather a large organization with its related special staff sections and could probably

work can be grouped as in Figure 6. Within the G-4 Operations Section would be grouped supply, embarka-

or 6 if a planning section is required. These would be the staff secretary and the 4 general staff section heads. In turn, each of the general staff section heads would have a reasonable number of subordinate supervisors to deal with. The staff would definitely be organized on a "command" system and each staff officer would have one immediate superior to whom to report and to whom he would be responsible. Under this organization, also, we would have one section head with overall responsibility for a major area of the commander's responsibilities.

In summary, it might be said that if the present trend of Marine Corps staff functioning continues we are going to end up with a command-type staff. If this is going to occur, it is believed that we should not slide into it from inertia but that we should stop, look and listen and then step into it effectively. To do so we must decide what we are to do and then set forth the principles by which we are going to accomplish the task.

The present system, and its execution, is frustrating both to the commanders and to their staff officers. The questions all too often asked are: "Who should do it," "Who should see that it is done?" "Who should have done it?" and "Why didn't he do it?"

It is believed that either of the proposed systems will eliminate the questions and uncertainties of individuals and will permit the accomplishment of staff work with maximum efficiency, with minimum personnel and with the most satisfaction to the commanders and staff. USMC




Figure 5

profit by some reorganization and consolidation. G-3's work can be summarized under the 3 main headings of operations, training and supporting arms. To put related subjects together, we have an organization as in Figure 5.

Under the 3 main headings of G-3 work could be grouped the many special staff sections and functions in much the same way as the G-1 special staff sections were grouped.

The G-4 Section with all its re-

tion and routine logistics administrative functions. The Supporting Troops Section would include the functions of engineers, motor transport, ordnance, LVT, shore party and communications. The Service Troops Section would include such sections as disbursing, dental and medical. Communications has been placed under the Supporting Troops Section of the G-4 Section as the logical place where all such supporting troops other than supporting





Figure 6

lated special staff sections is also rather a large organization and needs to be shaped into a more workable staff organization. The main sub-divisions of the logistics

arms should be.

The staff organization discussed above and illustrated in Figure 3 would place a total of 5 subordinate supervisors under the chief of staff,

Chart 3



The staff organized on a "command" system (incomplete)

SPLITTING THE SECTION

By Capt Henry J. Witkowski

TO A SECTION LEADER, SPLITTING the section is practically the greatest tactical error that could possibly be committed. Be it mortars, machine guns, or 75mm recoilless rifles, splitting the section is out no matter what the situation, visibility or terrain. Ask section leaders why these sections can't be split and the usual answer is "You don't use them that way," or "We never split them before and it just isn't done." I'm inclined to go along with keeping the section intact, but at the same time if the guns can be used more effectively by splitting the section, I don't believe just because it isn't customary is a good enough reason for not splitting the section now.

For 6 months as a platoon leader I had a section of light machine guns attached to my platoon. During all that time I used the guns separately a great deal and believe there are few, if any, platoon leaders who have not done the same. When setting up for defense, these guns were assigned sectors of fire and only upon unusual circumstances did the fire of these guns cross. Grazing fire over 50 to 75 yards (except when on a valley floor) was impossible to find.

Platoon fronts of 500 yards or more were not uncommon, and in rugged mountain terrain trying to use LMGs as a section would be wasting fire power that can never be spared. If the guns were ever set up close together, chances are one would be firing one direction and the other in the opposite direction. Usually the guns were set to cover either a nose or a draw and no attempt at tying them together was ever made. (Heavy guns were frequently employed in the same manner although a little more reluctantly.)

To a machine gunner with a little time in the Corps this rightly sounds a little foolish, but to anyone who has ever set up a gun in mountainous terrain it's often the only way they can be used most effectively.

On one or two occasions I've sug-


gested splitting the 60mm Mortar section while in the defense and received one of the afore stated answers. Although I've never been given the chance to see it tried I can't see why, under certain conditions, it wouldn't work to our advantage. For instance, a company has a frontage of approximately 2,500 meters—a very large frontage for a company but not a remote possibility—and the mortars are set up near the company CP which is approximately in the center of the company. Both flanks of the company are now out of range of the 60mm illuminating shell which has a range of about 1,100 yards. The mortar section has no means of communication other than the 536 radio which at best isn't foolproof and any fire missions would have to be sent over

the company wire net. Since the section does not have observers that could be sent to the various platoons, adjusting fire could become a problem. It would not be an ideal situation at best. Placing one mortar in each platoon area would solve all of these problems and give the platoon leader at least one mortar he could use effectively, simply by getting the CO's permission. It was not an uncommon practice to send one mortar out with a platoon-sized patrol and in many instances this one mortar proved invaluable. All the advantages of keeping the mortars as a section are quite apparent, but there are times when a great deal can be gained by using them individually.

There is record of one company commander requesting a section of 75mm recoilless rifles to eliminate some enemy bunkers. The battalion already had one section attached and in use by another company and since no other section was available at regiment the request was denied. The company that had the section could fire only one gun at a time and it was suggested that the other gun be sent to the other company. This suggestion was at first, to put it mildly, frowned upon. However, there were so many good targets in both areas it was decided to send one gun to the other company. Both these guns were in constant use and the efficiency of this section had been increased a hundred per cent by simply splitting the section. Had these guns been put to some other use besides destroying bunkers it would probably have been foolish to split them, but under the circumstances I don't think the guns could have been used more effectively.

The advantages of using a section as a section can not be denied. There are times when guns can be used to a better advantage one at a time rather than to dismiss the possibility with a, "It ain't never been done before" attitude. This isn't the kind of reasoning that made the Marine Corps the best fighting unit in the world today.

USMC



When the Germans drove into Russia they found out the hard way about . . .

COMBATTING SOVIET

By Ernst von Dohnanyi



GUERRILLA WARFARE HAS BECOME an essential part of modern strategy, a factor which should not be overlooked by the military leaders. This was sufficiently proved by the guerrilla and resistance movements in almost every occupied European country during World War II, in Indonesia, Indochina and Korea.

It seems, however, that the possibility of guerrilla warfare has been completely overlooked by the military planning staffs of the Western World. Consequently, the modern soldier is being trained to use every conceivable weapon to defend himself against the most terrible tools of destruction on land and in the air, but he still remains unprepared to cope with the equally dangerous and exacting work of combatting guerrillas. This negligence on the part of general staffs may prove to be as disastrous in the future as it was for the German armed forces during World War II.

The dogmatic attitude of the German General Staff during the Soviet campaign was, undoubtedly, one of the main reasons for its failure, originally to prevent and later, to suppress the Soviet guerrilla movement which inflicted so many losses upon the German fighting forces. Depending on the success of the blitzkrieg and the political weakness of the Communist regime in the Soviet Union, the Germans failed to make preparations for the severe Russian winter and apparently completely excluded the idea of a possible guerrilla threat from their minds. The arrogant and foolish policy of the German civil govern-

T GUERRILLAS

ment in regards to the Soviet people cannot be accepted as an excuse for the narrow-minded planning of the military authorities. Practically the identical shortsighted attitude as that of the German General Staff during World War II was displayed by the US military command during the Seminole Indian War in Florida under Jefferson's and Van Buren's administrations. The government troops dispatched to pacify the Indians were certainly sufficiently trained for orthodox battle but, not being familiar with Indian fighting in the woods, they paid a terrible toll in blood for their eventual success.

In order to comprehend the amazingly swift development of guerrilla bands it is necessary to review the events of 1941. Seeking to attain their main objective—the annihilation of major Soviet forces—German spearheads rushed eastward, broke through Soviet defenses, surrounded entire armies and spread confusion in the Soviet rear; but unfortunately, they paid little attention to dispersed units and scattered personnel who remained in the occupied areas. Naturally, Soviet officers and enlisted men who did not care to surrender disappeared into the countryside. Some exchanged their uniforms for civilian clothing and sought refuge in villages; others hid in swamps and forests; the more active of them organized guerrilla bands.

The early winter, the unexpected setback at Moscow, the inadequate supply of winter clothing and the breakdown of supply lines, forced



the German troops onto the defensive. Deep snow and severe cold compelled the poorly clothed and equipped troops to stay in settlements, which in turn permitted the still small guerrilla bands to remain undisturbed in the woods. By the spring of 1942 it was too late—numerous guerrilla groups had gained complete control over the territory not directly occupied by German forces. Innumerable assaults on communication and supply lines (and even on small German garrisons) forced the German units to concentrate solely on defending these vital arteries.

The organization of Soviet guerrilla bands was comparatively simple. Recruited from military personnel and fanatical communists, the bands established their headquarters and camps deep in inaccessible woodlands and swamps. If no direct threat of a German attack was expected, they billeted themselves in villages and small towns from which, in case of emergency, they could fall back to their hiding places in the forests. The population, being given no protection by German forces, willingly accepted and supported them. The bands varied in number from approximately 15 to 200 depending on the terrain, the availability of volunteers and the attitude of the populace towards the German invaders. Smaller bands were led by a detachment commander and a political commissar. Leaders of task groups or sabotage squads—dispatched to intercept a German sup-

ply truck, to destroy a railroad bridge, or to procure food—were appointed from among the most efficient members of the group.

Later, large guerrilla bands were subdivided into platoons and squads. Two or three bands were loosely organized into brigades. In time, communications were established between bands and brigades to the Soviet Supreme Command across the front lines. Procurement of arms and ammunition was easily accomplished from equipment thrown away by the soldiers of the routed Soviet armies. Food supply was available in villages and collective farms which in most cases, had not been dissolved by the Germans and were frequently still managed by the same Soviet functionaries—an error which proved to be of great assistance to the guerrillas. On the other hand, the lack of clothing and medical supplies appeared to be a considerable handicap to the guerrilla bands.

Their operations were chiefly limited to sabotage, cutting of German supply lines, mining of railroad tracks and roads and occasional assaults upon small German units. These missions were usually executed by small groups at night. In comparatively few cases did the guerrillas attack larger German units, and then only under the most advantageous circumstances. Thus, in the winter of 1941-42 a German engineer battalion was annihilated, while embarked on a train moving west of BRYANSK. Having stopped

Guerrilla organization and tactics were simple



52



Railroads—a lucrative target

Sovfoto



Guerrilla headquarters—inaccessible

Sovfoto



Communications—disrupted

Sovfoto



Bridges—simple sabotage sufficed

Marine Corps Gazette • February, 1955

the train by removing the rails in a cleared area, the guerrillas opened fire with four or five heavy machine guns and succeeded in killing most of the Germans before they managed to evacuate the train and reach a snow covered embankment. However, it offered no better protection than had the train against the murderous fire. The above incident was an isolated case; generally the guerrillas disappeared into the woods as soon as the approach of a German unit was reported by their sentries.


Greatly alarmed by the new threat, the German command initiated intensive study for appropriate methods of suppressing the guerrilla activities. To accomplish this, each commanding officer was authorized to do what he deemed best. Certain of them tried to hunt down the guerrilla bands by dispatching combat units into the woods. This method proved to be unsuccessful. If not confronted by superior guerrilla forces, or decimated in a trap, the companies or battalions returned after an abortive search with empty hands. The great advantage of guerrilla bands in woodlands lay in their mobility and ability to disperse and disappear among the population, their excellent communication with the local inhabitants and, in the clumsiness of regular army units inexperienced in backwoods fighting.

Efforts to eliminate the guerrilla movement through retaliatory measures against the population were even more disastrous. The endangered population fled into the same inaccessible areas and joined the guerrillas. It was often like an endless chain: small German units or supply trains were attacked in a village and routed. German reinforcements arriving later found no trace of guerrillas. The population was reluctant to give any information regarding the attackers, as they knew that after the departure of the Germans, they would have to account for their "treason" to the guerrillas who were the actual masters of the unprotected farmer. Their reluctance to speak seemed to the Germans to be a manifestation of loyalty to the banditti. Enraged by the sight of their dead comrades, the German soldiers frequently took revenge by shooting some innocent



Over-extended German supply lines were . . .

Sovfoto



. . . easily severed by agents who melted into the woods

Sovfoto

peasants or by burning down a part, or all of a village. These unjust acts merely increased the hatred of the native for the Germans and either led him to join the guerrilla bands, or made him a willing spy for them.

Large scale operations conducted by several regular divisions did little harm to the guerrilla movement. These thoroughly planned and expertly executed offensives might have guaranteed victory over a regular army unit operating in an orthodox manner, but they were not effective against a foe who had no permanent bases, who acted as an organized armed force one day and became a group of peaceful farmers the next. Having surrounded a large guerrilla-controlled area the

battalions would spread out in a line, create a tight circle around the objective and advance slowly through the brush and swamp in a combing operation. Whenever such a unit met opposition, reserves reinforced by tanks and artillery, would be dispatched to break the opposition and to annihilate the band. In spite of clever planning the majority of the guerrilla bands usually managed to escape from the endangered area before the operation started, simply because they had been forewarned by the increase of troops in the region, or by local informants.

In addition to the active measures described above, the German command was forced to employ many divisions for the static defense of



Blockhouses by the thousands

Sovfoto



Rumanian troops executing a clean-up

Second-class troops were no match for . . .



. . . sudden and violent guerrilla action



Sovfoto

roads, railroads and other means of communication. These vital lines had been fortified—thousands of bunkers, palisades and entrenched posts had been built along the railroads and roads; patrols walked from post to post in order to prevent sabotage on the tracks and to detect hidden mines. This task was performed chiefly by German guard regiments, Hungarian and Rumanian units and indigenous volunteer units. None of them were very reliable: the German units because of age and quality of personnel (either too old or physically disqualified for service in combat units), the allies because of their unwillingness to fight for the German cause, the indigenous volunteers because they had no real reason to fight.

It was a dangerous situation for the Germans. All of these efforts had failed to eliminate the danger of guerrilla raids which, in fact,

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Even though costly, raids grew in frequency and ferocity



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Exterminating guerrillas was difficult in terrain ... which favored their movement in remote areas

were growing in frequency and ferocity.


In spite of this apparently hopeless situation some German generals and commanders did find appropriate means to meet this threat. Their flexible plans enabled them to adopt unorthodox tactics and, in doing so, finally to succeed in either forcing the guerrilla bands to withdraw or to reduce their activities.

The most outstanding example was conceived by the commanding general of the German Second Panzer Army, Generaloberst (ColGen) Schmidt. In early December 1941 this army had been stopped south of Moscow and had been driven back to the stabilized line ZHDANKA-OREL-KURSK. It was discovered that almost the entire rear, with the exception of larger towns like BRYANSK, BEZHITSKA, KARACHEV, DMITROVSK, DMITRIYEV and SEVSK was under guerrilla control (see map). The supply lines for the whole army consisted of a single railroad OREL-KARACHEV-BRYANSK-UNETCHA-ORSHA-MINSK and the highway OREL-BRYANSK-ROSLAVL'-SMO-LENSK. The areas south of BRYANSK including LOKOT' and TRUBCHEVSK, and north of this city including DYAD'KOVO and LYUDINOVO, were controlled by strong guerrilla bands which were a constant threat to these supply lines. In the spring of 1942 the towns of DYAD'KOVO and LYUDINOVO had been cleared of guerrillas by German troops. However, their garrisons were connected with one another only by means of one road and a branch railroad line which were also subjected to frequent guerrilla attacks.

The area south of BRYANSK is divided by the BRYANSK-L'GOV railroad into a wooded section west of the railroad and plains east of it.

The eastern section was soon brought under control by the Germans. Garrisons were stationed in KARACHEV, BRASSOVO, NAVLYA and LOKOT'. The district enclosed by these towns, with the exception of its northern part, offered no protec-


tion to guerrilla bands and was quickly abandoned by them. On the contrary, the area between the railroad and the Desna River was covered with woods and swamps, which formed perfect terrain for guerrilla hiding places and camps. An esti-





Swamps—perfect refuge and hiding places . . .

Sovfoto



. . . for a people at home in the woods

Sovfoto



Co-operation of local officials—an immediate necessity . . .



. . . to win the confidence and support of the local populace

mated 6,000 guerrillas and an equal number of farmers and their families populated this area. The available German reserves—some Hungarian regiments—were ordered to guard the BRYANSK-L'GOV railroad line. The commanding general of the Second Panzer Army assigned only a small number of other troops to check the guerrilla assaults.

The tactics formulated by Generaloberst Schmidt to suppress guerrilla operations south of BRYANSK deserve a special study which, unfortunately, cannot be made at this time. However, a brief description of the events may suffice to demonstrate the ingenuity of his plan.

In March 1942 a horse drawn sled arrived from KARACHEV in NAVLYA and LOKOT', bringing a small group of Russian civilians. The chief, one Kaminski, a slender, energetic, middle-aged man, presented to the German garrison commanders "to-whom-it-may-concern" orders signed by Generaloberst Schmidt, which requested German units to render every possible assistance to the bearer of the order. Furthermore, the order appointed Kaminski as governor of the area including the towns of NAVLYA, LOKOT', DMITROVSK, DMITRIYEV and SEVSK. He was authorized to act independently, to appoint local officials, to organize the economy of the area and, what is more important, he was responsible only to Generaloberst Schmidt. No German officer in this area was to interfere with Kaminski's activities.

The new governor immediately appointed *Buergermeister* (mayors), proclaimed the abolishment of the collective farm system, supervised the distribution of the remaining implements and stock among farmers, and started the organization of local militia for the protection of this area against guerrilla raids. This reorganization changed the situation entirely. From then on, every cow, horse, pig and loaf of bread were the private property of the farmer Ivanov or Petrov. The population went to work with great eagerness. At last, it seemed, the Germans were acting as they had been expected to: at last they began to abolish the hated collective farms; to give the population self government and to limit their own influence merely to military needs. At


the same time the newly created property owners turned their wrath against guerrillas who still visited their villages at night seeking food. Prior to Kaminski's time, the farmer had watched apathetically while the foraging bands confiscated collective farm stock; however, now "he" was directly affected, "he" was going to lose his own property, his cow, or pig. Many young men enlisted in the local militia and were treated by the population with the greatest respect. By the summer of 1942 the marauding guerrilla bands were met with fierce resistance. Every step outside of the protecting woods became dangerous; for every bit of food seized in a village during a night raid they had to pay with blood. Both parties were at home in this territory; both fought for their livelihood; both fought without mercy. Gradually the antagonism between guerrillas and farmers began to overshadow the events of the war, politics and even their dislike of the Germans. The militia, unassisted by the Germans, equipped itself with what could be found in the woods—left there by the retreating Soviet army. Efforts were made to repair and employ some of the ex-Soviet heavy equipment—tanks, anti-tank guns, howitzers, mortars, machine guns, etc. Finally, Kaminski's force became a formidable brigade, consisting of 5 or 6 battalions of 500 to 600 men each, a tank unit with 10 to 12 light tanks and an artillery battalion with some 20 guns. This number was not only sufficient to stop the guerrilla raids on the villages and towns of the area, but also to launch counter-raids and, with the assistance of some German units, even a counter-offensive in the spring of 1943. During this offensive, Kaminski's militia drove the guerrillas from practically the entire area between DMITROVSK, DMITRIYEV, SEVSK and LOKOT' and pushed the borders of the "liberated area" 10 to 15 kilometers northwest of LOKOT' and about 7 kilometers west of the BRYANSK-L'GOV railroad line. Considering the fact that he received neither arms nor supply from the Germans, Kaminski's success exceeded all expectations. No doubt, had not the German retreat interrupted this development Kaminski would have succeeded in his

task of pacifying the entire area entrusted to him. Events, however, forced the indigenous militia to join the German forces in their retreat west. A few weeks later Kaminski's militia, having lost their primary reason for fighting, deprived of their property and knowing that there would be no pardon by Soviet authorities, became a mere gang of bandits who plundered the population, indulged in drinking, quarrelled with the Germans and among themselves, refused to fight, and at last were disbanded by the German command.

Sound ideas were sometimes also born among field personnel of the German army. Some battalion, company and platoon leaders formulated methods for effective small-scale antiguerrilla warfare. If properly developed, these ideas could

serve as a basis for the organization of special antiguerrilla units in the armed forces of the Western World.

After the retreat from Moscow in the winter of 1941-42, a German communications battalion was ordered to occupy BEZHITSA. As has been mentioned, this surrounded town and its outskirts were repeatedly raided by guerrilla bands, which were hiding in the woodlands north and northwest of the town. In order to keep these unpleasant neighbors away from BEZHITSA, the battalion commander established several outposts on the periphery of the city. The most advanced post was stationed in the village of CHAIKOVICH, about 3 kilometers north of BEZHITSA (see map). Fortunately, the commander of this post was a German who had spent many years in the Soviet Union and was fa-





Sovfoto

With impudence they constantly mined the road



Continual patrols at irregular times . . .

familiar with Russian customs, the Russian mind and the Russian language. Having no definite orders, this officer was at liberty to wage war in his own way. The post garrison consisted of 15 German soldiers and about as many native volunteers (sons of kulaks, persons persecuted by the Soviets for political or criminal reasons and some adventurers). It required no special intelligence to discover that guerrilla scouts were watching this post from a very short distance, that some of the villagers were guerrilla spies, and that every German move was immediately reported to the headquarters of the guerrilla band. With insulting impudence the guerrillas constantly mined the road from BEZHITSA to DYAD'KOVO just outside of CHAIKOVICHI. Almost every day, trucks proceeding in convoy to DYAD'KOVO were destroyed on this unpaved road. The commanding officer of the CHAIKOVICHI post decided that some action must be taken. Having picked out a group of 12 reliable Germans and natives, he undertook to reconnoiter the surrounding area. For several days this

squad criss-crossed the entire region, avoiding deliberately the woods and ravines until everyone became familiar with the terrain. Then, paying attention to utmost secrecy, the patrols were shifted to night-time. At irregular times, without confiding his plans even to the German personnel, the post commander summoned his squad and left the village using a covered route in order to avoid observation. Having reached the extensive woods north or west of the village, the squad waited until dawn. This precaution was necessary in order to deceive the guerrilla sentries watching the German post from various points during the day, and perhaps from the village itself at night. An encounter with guerrillas in the forest was not to be feared. The squad was equipped with automatic weapons and hand grenades and was thoroughly indoctrinated for such a fight. If worst came to worst, a retreat would present no difficulties: the tree trunks offered sufficient protection against rifle fire; an envelopment by the enemy would be extremely difficult to perform; the



Sovfoto

. . . finally stopped the saboteurs

fire-power of automatic rifles and submachine guns was sufficient to create a gap in a comparatively thin guerrilla line. Moreover, it was unlikely that a guerrilla band would stand and fight a German unit whose strength was unknown to them.

After a period of approximately four weeks, during which time scouting was carried on almost daily, the squad had sufficiently explored the area to determine the approximate location of the guerrilla camp. Scouts discovered fresh paths and guerrilla messages or warnings written on the bark of trees. Most of the paths led from the margin of the woods to a swampy district some 4 kilometers inside the forest. The first important work had been accomplished. The commander realized that his unit was too small for an attack on the hideout. Consequently, reinforcements were requested. The request was approved and the reinforcements promised for a date in the near future. Meanwhile the reconnaissance squad in CHAIKOVICHI shifted from scouting to ambush tactics. Leaving the vil-

lage with the same caution, the squad marched after sunset across the country to places from which they could watch the BEZHITSA-DYAD'KOVO road, which frequently was mined by guerrilla saboteurs. The patience of the squad was put to a considerable strain; having spent a night at one place, the ambush party learned that mines had been laid at another site. However, one night, while lying in the grass on a flat knoll dominating the road, the scouts saw three or four figures moving on the road. At a signal from the leader the squad opened fire. The surprised guerrillas ran into the dark without firing a single shot, but left one of their party, a boy of about 17 who had been killed by a burst of machine gun fire. This rather small victory would not be worth-while mentioning, had it not caused the discontinuance of mine laying on this road. The guerrillas seemed to be greatly surprised and apparently frightened since they did not know how many such ambushes were laid, from whence the enemy came, and how strong he was.

Some days later, returning from a reconnaissance trip into the woods, the squad surprised a man lying under a tree about 100 meters in front of the woods. In a semi-circle, concealed by the high grass, the scouts approached the man. Startled by a crack of a dry branch or some other sound, the stranger jumped to his feet, and seeing several Germans, took to flight. A few bursts brought him down. A second man, unnoticed so far, jumped down from the tree with raised hands. It appeared that this was a sentry post watching the traffic on the road to DYAD'KOVO. In addition, this post was to notify the guerrilla camp back in the woods of approaching danger.


At last the promised reinforcements arrived in BEZHITSA. It was important not to arouse the suspicions of the guerrillas in CHAIKOVICH. Therefore, both the infantry company and the reconnaissance squad were embarked on tarpaulin-covered trucks in BEZHITSA and, together with the usual convoy, departed as if for DYAD'KOVO. The assault force dismounted from trucks deep in the woods above CHAIKOVICH and northeast of the

suspected guerrilla camp. The captured guerrilla sentry was to be the guide. Having his hands tied and led on a rope, the prisoner was made to understand that disobedience or treachery would mean certain death to him. After about a 2-hour march the unit arrived without incident at the swamp. Disclosures of the guerrilla indicated that the camp was pitched about 500 meters farther southwest on a hill in the middle of this area. The swamp appeared to be only waist deep. The company spread out and the soldiers advanced at an interval of 5 or 6 paces in order not to lose sight of one another. In spite of this the left wing of the company advanced too quickly and three or four men popped up in the guerrilla camp long before the rest of the company had arrived. The surprise was complete. The band had

just started their breakfast which was served in primitive pots on rough hewn tables. Terrified by the sudden appearance of the Germans, the guerrillas, amongst whom there were several women, fled in panic in all directions, leaving everything behind. Those who ran towards the approaching German line were either killed or captured; others managed to escape into the protection of the brush and high grass. In all probability the major part of the routed band found other guerrilla groups and continued their activities in another district. At any rate, the area between BEZHITSA and DYAD'KOVO seemed to be taboo for guerrillas from this time on. Not a single assault, not a single mine were reported or discovered until the retreat of the German troops in August 1943.

Neither of the two examples—


Closing the ring about a known guerrilla camp . . .



. . . the partisans were caught completely unawares

Sovfoto





ovfoto

Guerrillas must be deprived of freedom of movement

Friendly lines of communication must be kept open

Kaminski and the CHAIKOVICH squad were decisive victories over the guerrilla movement. But, and this cannot be sufficiently stressed, they demonstrated one very essential thing: namely, that guerrillas cannot survive in an area where they are deprived of a food supply and freedom of movement. To achieve this objective, methods other than those prescribed for normal combat must be adopted.

II

The effectiveness of a regular military unit depends chiefly upon its combined firepower and co-ordinated action. If control is lost so that each small unit must operate without this overall coordination, it loses a great deal of its strength. Consequently, when a unit is forced to fight in a strange country over unfamiliar terrain, this unit will prefer to fight in the open, where control is easier and fire power can be fully utilized.

On the other hand, the very nature of guerrilla bands accounts for their preference for close country and woodlands; areas where they can easily retreat and hide themselves. Since there is no central authority such as the State to enforce discipline, it is almost impossible to forge a guerrilla band into a unit which would be the equal of a regular command and which could offer battle in the open.

But in their native mountains, forests or swamps, guerrillas are far superior to regular forces since they can attack their enemy whenever they hold the advantages of time and terrain and are assured of a safe retreat. From their hidden camps they can easily watch the enemy, maintain communications with their agents in occupied settlements and

between their own bands. It requires no special intelligence work for them to find out the location of enemy troops as well as their vulnerable supply and communication lines. Knowing these things, a guerrilla can live and move about in his area without great danger. He can even enter the villages and towns which are under the control of the invading forces.

Apart from the purely political and psychological means of preventing or suppressing a guerrilla movement, it remains to be considered what can or cannot be done from a strictly military point of view. The answer does not seem to be very complicated: *guerrillas must be fought with guerrilla methods* by specially trained units which can be trained and equipped without great cost and without detriment to the major force. However, it is necessary that serious consideration be given to this problem by the responsible command.

As soon as an army penetrates into foreign territory it must assign a certain number of units to guard its supply and communication lines as well as for garrison duty. The employment of some of these units for active suppression of guerrilla bands would tend to decrease their number rather than require additional personnel. But these anti-guerrilla units must be previously organized and trained in order to achieve success.

German experiences during World War II proved that:

a.) Units assigned to guerrilla warfare must operate directly under a corps or army staff.

b.) They must be completely mobile in summer and winter.



Antiguerrilla forces must be kept mobile summer and winter

c.) They must consist of appropriately equipped, independently operating companies or battalions.

d.) The personnel must be carefully chosen and thoroughly trained for this special task.

A suggested organization for such an antiguerrilla battalion is as follows:

(1) *Personnel*: If possible, volunteers; to be chosen from such professions as: rangers, woodsmen, professional and amateur hunters, as well as from the rural population of wooded and mountainous areas. People who are acquainted with the terrain and language of the presumed enemy country are to be preferred. Volunteers from urban areas may also become proficient. Age: between 18 and 40. Special requirements: well developed ability to find

Flame is effective against hideaways

Mountains and woods may require independent units

one's bearings, be a good marksman with several weapons, maturity and good physical condition.

(2) *Training:* Basic military training. Have a thorough knowledge and be expert in use of all organic weapons and, if possible, those of the enemy. Operational training in woods, swamps and mountains: operating alone (the fear of fighting when alone against guerrillas must be taken from the fighter), or within a squad or in platoon formation; training in the systematic search of towns and villages; accurate snap-shooting; the use of mine-detectors; laying and removal of mines; skiing; conduct of operations in the winter; use of snow as shelter and woodsmanship. In addition, lectures should be delivered regarding the way of life and the customs of the presumed enemy people; the best ways to treat them in order to win their friendship and support; rules of land warfare and how they are to be applied in case of guerrilla warfare (justly but severely) and economic conditions of the occupied country.

(3) *Organization and Equipment:* The organization of a Marine Corps battalion with its squads sub-divided into fire teams and its great firepower would roughly meet with the requirements of an antiguerrilla battalion. Its equipment may generally be the same. However, keeping in mind the fact that companies, platoons and even squads may be forced to operate independently, some additional equipment must be supplied to these units. Squads dispatched into woods or mountains must be provided with means of communications, that is to say light,

portable radios with sufficient range (at least 3 miles); platoons need more powerful sets in order to maintain communications with the company headquarters which may be located at a greater distance. The battalion must be equipped with a sufficient number of trucks to guarantee the mobility of the unit and its sub-divisions. The availability of one or two armored cars would greatly facilitate the mobility of battalion and company commanders, as well as being a valuable asset where greater fire support is needed. Since in some places guerrillas use fortifications (dugouts and bunkers), the assignment of 2 or 3 recoilless guns and perhaps a flame-thrower team, would prevent unnecessary casualties. Mine detectors should be available to every platoon.

(4) *Operations:* The antiguerrilla battalion, being directly attached to the army or corps headquarters, may be used for guard duty, search of towns, etc., until the receipt of information on the presence of guerrilla bands in a certain area. Then, depending on the supposed number of guerrillas, a platoon or company is dispatched to the endangered sector. Company headquarters may be set up in the town which is the nearest to the area of operations. A platoon of this company may be sent into a village in the immediate neighborhood of the supposed guerrilla hiding place. This comparatively small unit will not unduly alarm the guerrillas and will leave them unprepared for a possible round-up. Squads will reconnoiter the nearby woods and swamps, to intercept guerrilla runners and sentries and lay ambushes for guerrilla mining teams, until


positive information on the location and strength of the guerrilla band is obtained. Then the company, and if necessary the battalion, may be called in and can be skillfully directed to assault and to annihilate or, at least, disperse the band. During these preparations the members of antiguerrilla units must establish contact with the population and support their fight by psychological treatment of the natives. They must be always ready to help the farmer, to protect him and, if possible, to win him as an associate and co-fighter. Members of these units must always be on their guard against treachery. *Patience* and *caution* are the first and most important rules for a successful operation and for the prevention of unnecessary casualties.

☛ IF THE MILITARY antiguerrilla activities are assisted by a resourceful and flexible policy, perhaps as displayed by Generaloberst Schmidt during WWII in the BRYANSK-LOKOT' area, the task of suppressing a guerrilla movement, or at least of reducing it to insignificance will be greatly facilitated.

It must be emphasized that in order to wage an effective anti-guerrilla campaign the responsible leaders must be well acquainted with not only the physical aspects of the enemy force, but also they must fully understand the psychology of the indigenous population. This knowledge will enable them to establish a policy which the population will recognize not only for its effectiveness but, what is more important, for its humane and just consideration of the welfare of the local inhabitants. Guerrillas starve without the support of the people. US ☛ MC

Amphibious

Objectives



By LtCol Frederick Aldridge

**Selection of objectives
is the keystone of all good
amphibious planning**

THE CRUX OF DETAILED AMPHIBIOUS planning is the selection of proper objectives for the landing force. All other staff work, the burning of midnight oil, etc. are merely planning steps to insure that the selected objectives are seized and held.

To go a step further — once the proper objectives are selected, the scheme of maneuver merely outlines the plan of the landing force to seize the objectives. After that, a plan of supporting fires is drawn up to coordinate the fires of the supporting arms which will assist the infantry and tanks in seizing ground objec-

tives. Finally, the landing plan insures the orderly, timely and continuous landing of the troops and equipment required to seize the objectives. We can best put it this way — the selection of objectives is the keystone of amphibious planning. All other plans support the basic decisions that resulted in the selection of objectives!

Important to the planners, objectives are *vital* to those who execute the plans — the commanders in the field who seize the ground objectives. Let us look for a moment at two ex-

ecutors of a plan for an amphibious attack — a platoon leader and the landing force commander.

"1st Platoon, A Company, lands over the left of Beach Orange 1, seizes enemy positions at POINT MIKE, prepared to continue attack on order to seize Hill 70 . . ."

The platoon leader has received his mission *and* his objectives for the first phase of the amphibious landing. He will receive more orders, missions and objectives until the operation is completed. From the platoon leader's restricted viewpoint the operation could well look like Figure 1 — a long string of circles to

be seized. Actually, the platoon leader will be fighting for limited objectives. His small unit actions, when multiplied by the number of platoons in the fight, will finally add up to the operation itself and to the seizure of the final objective.

The landing force commander, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the final objective(s) assigned to the landing force. His subordinate commanders will receive lesser objectives, but the landing force commander alone retains the big one, the final (Force) objective (Figure 2).

All the training of our combat forces is directed at perfecting the ability of units either to seize objectives or to support the seizure of objectives. Platoon leaders, company, battalion, regimental commanders — all direct their best efforts to training their troops in the tactics and techniques of seizing objectives. But what about the planning phase — are the planners using the best planning procedures in selecting objectives for the combat units to seize? Is the planning for selecting the objectives as good as the tactics and techniques for actually seizing these same objectives?

Unfortunately, the selection of objectives results in the greatest Tower of Babel in all amphibious thinking. This confusion arises from a lack of understanding of:

1. A clear cut system for selecting and designating amphibious objectives.
2. What type and number of objectives each echelon of command should select.

Before looking at types of objectives let's recap the characteristics of ground objectives as we all know

Figure 1 — limited objectives





Figure 2 — final objective

them. Figure 3 shows graphically the well known characteristics of the objective. Objectives selected for seizure by elements of a landing force should, if possible, possess these characteristics. And of these characteristics it is fundamental that the "force" be capable of seizing the assigned objective(s).


Let us start at the beginning of the amphibious planning cycle and see how objectives are selected and decide if there is room for improvement in our planning techniques.

The Amphibious Task Force is given the mission, "to seize the ABLE-TOWN area and the port and airfield facilities therein in order to provide for a base for further operations." Here we have the big, broad brush, with the details on objectives yet to be placed into the picture.

At the highest troop echelon, the landing force, one of the first steps in planning is the selection of the

final ground objective(s) — seizure of such objectives should insure success for the amphibious attack. Figure 4 shows Hill 1,000 dominating the port, airfield, and road net of ABLE-TOWN. It would be selected as the final ground objective of the landing force.

Figure 3 — characteristics






Figure 4—final ground objective

So far so good, but now we run into a point of confusion. "What is the relation of Hill 1,000 to the location of a beachhead for the landing force?" Should Hill 1,000 be inside or outside the beachhead to be selected?

The answer to these questions depends on the relative location of the possible landing beaches and Hill 1,000. In Figure 5 the landing force of corps size must land over beaches some distance from ABLETOWN. After the landing force seizes the beachhead it will reorganize and attack from out of its beachhead to seize the final ground objective for the amphibious attack—Hill 1,000. Note that the beachhead does not include Hill 1,000, yet the beachhead is of sufficient size to permit the continuous landing of the landing force. This beachhead provides sufficient maneuver room for the "breakout" and attack toward the final ground objective.

Had there been adequate beaches close to Hill 1,000, this hill probably would have been included as a ground objective within the force beachhead (Figure 6). In this example, seizure of Hill 1,000 would place in the possession of the landing force:

- (1) One of the principal ground objectives whose seizure would insure the integrity of the beachhead itself and,
- (2) The final ground objective.

The selection of the final objective for the landing force leads us to the next problem—the selection of the physical objectives *within* the beachhead. Objectives in this category must assist us in either seizing or holding the beachhead itself.

Ideally, a beachhead should be delimited by high ground that can be assigned as objectives. If the physi-




Figure 5—the beachhead, w/o Hill 1,000





Figure 6—the beachhead, w/ Hill 1,000

cal relationship of the landing beaches to the critical terrain (possible objectives) is such that a natural beachhead results—so much the better. The Force beachhead would in this case be delimited by high ground (objectives Figure 7). If no high ground were close to the landing beaches, the size and location of the beachhead would be based on other factors—primarily on the ter-

rain required for the maneuver and protection of the landing force (whatever its size).

Having selected the final objectives that outlined the beachhead (Figure 7) amphibious planners could select additional objectives within the beachhead. These additional objectives could be "intermediate" objectives to permit major units to reorganize prior to contin-

Figure 7—beachhead delimited by high ground objectives






Figure 8—initial movement inland




Figure 9—initial objective, Hill 200 or Hill 350?

using the attack, or "initial" objectives to insure the seizure of critical terrain near the beaches. We usually consider terrain close to the beach as critical if its possession by the enemy could interfere with the success of the continuing ship-to-shore movement and the initial movement inland (Figure 8).

The discussion thus far has been based on the usual procedure of selecting objectives in terms of final, intermediate and initial objectives—but what is wrong with this method of selection objectives?

Ambiguous terminology is a weakness of this present system. Take the term "initial objective"—a dangerous phrase that may have more than one meaning. In Figure 9, Hill 200 could be an "initial" objective for the battalion on the right—it is an objective assigned by RCT for immediate seizure. At the same time this hill, as one of the objectives outlining the beachhead itself and required to insure the integrity of the beachhead, could also be considered as a "final objective" by the highest echelon.

Hill 350 may be the "initial" objective of the right division as a whole—the first objective requiring co-ordinated effort of more than one major element of the division. But, based on terrain relationship considerations it is an "intermediate" objective—an objective that must be seized by the division prior to seizing the final objectives within the beachhead. Yet, were a helicopter force landed on Hill 350, this hill would surely be the "initial" objective for that force.

This confusion of terms can be largely eliminated by using a different approach to the selection and

designation of objectives. The present system theoretically classifies objectives as to their order of seizure—as initial, intermediate, or final objectives. The system breaks down because of the opposing opinions of large units versus small units. Now let us look at another approach that classifies amphibious objectives according to the PURPOSE they serve for the force as a whole:

1. Those objectives whose seizure would keep the fire of enemy direct-fire weapons from the landing beaches.
2. Those objectives whose seizure would keep the mass of enemy observed artillery fire from the landing beach area.
3. Those objectives whose seizure would keep the mass of enemy artillery fire from the landing area.

Each general type of objective could be given a classification such as Phase 1 Objective etc. Recapped, this system would look like this:

This system of classification of objectives applied to Figure 8 would label the five hills outlining the beachhead as Phase 3 Objectives, Hill 350 as a Phase 2 Objective and Hill 150 as a Phase 1 Objective.

(Note: The Phase 1, 2, or 3 objectives should not be confused with "Phase Lines." The purpose of the latter is to control the movement of troops and are used by amphibious planners in special circumstances.)

The "phase approach" to objectives has the advantage of classifying objectives by the purpose they serve for the landing force. This method of classifying objectives not only clarifies the purpose of the seizure of ground objectives, but reduces the confusing terminology of the present system by meaning one thing to all men.

So much for the first point of con-

PURPOSE OF SEIZING OBJECTIVES	CLASSIFICATION
To keep enemy direct fire from the landing beaches	Phase 1 Objectives
To keep mass of enemy observed artillery fire from the landing beach area	Phase 2 Objectives
To keep mass of enemy artillery fire from the landing area	Phase 3 Objectives



The planners must eventually assign tasks to specific units

fusion found in the selection of amphibious objectives. The second problem has to do with delineating the type and number of objectives each echelon of command should select during amphibious planning.

We have seen that during the earlier stages of planning, objectives should be analyzed and selected in the light of what effect their seizure has on the continuity of the landing itself, the initial movement inland and on further operations. The words "earlier stages of planning" are used deliberately since a different approach to the thinking on objectives begins when the planning leaves the "task" or "what has to be done" stage and enters the "what unit does it" stage.

The "what unit does it" stage of the planning finds formal expression

in the operation order. Prior to this, amphibious planners can draw circles on critical terrain all over the map. They can agree that Hill 150 must be seized to keep direct fire off the beaches, and that Hill 350 must be seized to reduce the enemy's observed artillery fire potential. (Figure 8). These general tasks of seizing critical terrain noted above were, in the initial planning, just jobs that had to be done.

But the planners eventually must assign tasks to specific units. These tasks resolve themselves into the seizure of objectives—usually terrain. The assignment of objectives to lower units goes beyond remembering the 5 characteristics of an objective and then assigning objectives that comply with the "book" requirements. There remains the staff prob-

lem of expressing the assignment of objectives in orders to specific units. Inherent in this problem is the decision as to the detail the higher echelon should place in its orders to lower units.

The increased time available for planning amphibious operations, as compared to a land operation, may permit a higher commander (landing force) to develop his scheme of maneuver in great detail. This is not only logical but is a *must* resulting from the required co-ordination of supporting elements (naval gunfire, air, etc.) with the landing plan and the scheme of maneuver itself. For these reasons, a landing force of corps size may, in its amphibious operations order, specifically assign to its subordinate divisions ground objectives that can be seized by a battalion or even a company. This assignment of what may be termed small unit objectives in the operation orders of higher echelons is often required to insure:

- (1) The safety of the landing force as a whole.
- (2) Control of the movement of units.
- (3) Co-ordination of supporting arms.




Figure 11—objectives, right division




Figure 10—terrain considered critical to the success of the force


The highest landing force echelon (a force of corps size in this case—Figure 10—Operations Overlay) assigned in its order as objectives for seizure only terrain considered critical to the success of the force as a whole. BAKER, being high ground dominating the landing beaches of the entire force, was designated as

an objective. ABLE and CHARLIE had somewhat the same characteristics and in addition formed part of the perimeter of hills outlining the force beachhead. The latter comment is also true for objectives EASY, FOX and GEORGE. DOG was included since the seizure of this hill on the boundary between divisions required co-ordination by the landing force.

Upon receipt of the landing force order the division on the right completed and issued its order and operation overlay (Figure 11). The objectives assigned to the division by the landing force were repeated and the division added one additional objective, Hill 350. Seizure of this hill would assist the co-ordination of the advance of the division in its attack toward the final objectives assigned by the landing force.

The right RCT found it necessary

Figure 12—objectives, right RCT



to assign further objectives to co-ordinate the movement of its assault battalions during the period immediately after landing. Additional objectives that would provide this co-ordination were selected as shown in Figure 12.

The battalions, in turn, would assign objectives to their assault companies. In this case the objectives already assigned to the battalions by RCT fulfill most of the requirements for the critical terrain to be assigned assault companies. The right battalion has already been assigned sufficient objectives by RCT to insure initial co-ordination of the action of its companies. The battalion has only to further assign these objectives to its assault companies to insure seizure of the ground that can protect the landing beaches from enemy direct fire weapons. (Phase I Objectives).

The battalion on the left found it necessary to assign to its companies objectives in addition to those shown on the RCT overlay. This is particularly true in the left half of its zone near the beach where co-ordination on the ground with the adjacent RCT would be a problem. Such a battalion operations overlay might look like Figure 13.

To return to the platoon leader who received his order earlier in this article, his company commander (A Company) assigned each platoon leader an objective that would advance the attack of the company as a whole. The 1st Platoon would be assigned the mission of destroying




Figure 13—objectives, left Bn


the enemy positions at POINT MIKE just inland from the beach (Figure 13). From there the platoon could either be assigned the mission of protecting the Company (and RCT) flank or of seizing part of Hill 70.

That outlines the two major problems in the planning for the determination of amphibious objectives. As the planning for the operation continues the orders flow down all the way from the landing force to the platoons. During the planning, the big objectives are broken down and the platoon leaders are finally assigned their small pieces of terrain. Then the amphibious assault—when it's the other way around. The platoon leader takes his little hill so that the big objectives can be reported as—"The Landing Force seized Force Objective BAKER at 211300."

USMC

These tasks resolve themselves into the seizure of objectives





✻ WRITING ON THE SUBJECT OF Marine Corps helicopters, Lynn Montross, the military historian, recently said, "In both of these Nak-tong Bulge assaults VMO-6 aircraft carried out their usual missions (evacuation, rescue, reconnaissance and liaison), though the HO3S-1s scored a first on 3 September with a successful helicopter wire-laying mission in combat." And, "... on 20 September (1951), despite the fog, HMR-161 completed the first helicopter-borne landing of a combat unit in history. ... As a final touch, 8 miles of wire were laid in 15 minutes to the CP of the 1st Marines."

All of which serves to introduce the topic to be discussed.

On 12 February 1952 the Commanding General Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic directed that a series of tests be conducted to determine suitable procedures for laying field wire, wire WD-1/TT, W-130 and W-110-B by helicopter. During the period 20 March to 10 April 1952 2d Signal Battalion and Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 261, employing the HRS-1 helicopter and only that telephone equipment which is organic to Marine Corps

troop units, laid over 60 miles of the above types of field telephone wire in compliance with the Commanding General's directive. The author was privileged to participate in these tests; the results of which were little short of amazing.

Starting the tests literally from scratch, helicopter wire-laying was "tried" from every possible combination of wire and dispenser. And it was discovered, to my amazement at least, that, subject to the weight and climatological limitations of the helicopter, the HRS-1 was capable of laying *any* telephone wire in field use by Marines from *any* drum or dispenser in field use by Marines!

These tests were marred by two early failures, however. Failures which occurred; first by attempting to lay Wire WD-1/TT from the high-speed dispenser (MX-306A) by holding the dispenser out the cargo door of the aircraft as it is done in other helicopters, and letting the unwinding wire fall to the ground below as the aircraft was flown along its course. This attempt failed when the telephone wire fouled itself around the helicopter's starboard main landing gear and quickly


pulled apart. The second failure occurred on one of the early attempts to lay wire from a drum, and very nearly resulted in the demise of the entire venture. An attempt was being made to lay Wire W-130 from two Drums DR-4, the drums being rewound and prespliced in such manner that when one drum was exhausted the other would automatically start feeding. The drums were mounted on a reel and arbor assembly, Reel RL-31, which was securely lashed over the sonar well in the middle of the helicopter's cargo compartment. All went well until the first drum was exhausted; when the imbalance caused by one empty and one full DR-4 (wt 82 lbs) spinning at high speed on a common axle produced such serious vibrations that the arbor broke its mounts! The helicopter was brought to a hover and the wire crew succeeded in controlling the assembly before any injury or serious damage had been incurred. From this shaky start, tests were successfully completed employing every other possible combination of wire and drum or dispenser.

Wire W-130 was successfully dis-

**Lay your wire by
helicopter. It's simple
fast and efficient**

dispensed from the small Spool DR-8 and Reel RL-39 assemblies simply by holding it out the sonar well of the helicopter until the end of the drum was reached; at which time the pilot was instructed to "hover" while a new drum was spliced into position. The successful laying of over 3 miles was made in this manner in 20 minutes' time, during which the craft flew at a speed of 20 knots and hovered motionless in the air for five periods of 60-90 seconds while new half-mile drums were spliced into position. Hard work, but it could be done, and about ten times as fast as it could be done through the swamps of Camp Lejeune by any other means!

During the course of the Camp Lejeune tests it was further demonstrated that combat Wire W-130 and field Wire W-110-B could be safely dispensed from single drums, DR-4 and DR-5, at ground speeds of approximately 25 knots. Most successful of the drum-wound wire experiments was Wire W-130 on the Drum DR-5. This 245-pound package contained approximately 5 miles of wire which was successfully laid in *less than 12 minutes* from start of the



laying until successful hookup by the test crews on the ground. Although tests were limited to approximately 5 miles it should be possible to lay 10-15 miles of this type wire within 35 minutes under favorable operating conditions.

Tremendous possibilities in this direction were pointed out recently by *The Tandemeer*, house organ of the Piasecki Helicopter Corporation, which devoted considerable space to presentation of a series of experiments conducted by the US Army. The H-25 helicopter (Navy Model HUP) was employed as a "flying crane" to make permanent telephone installations; which included not only the laying of the wire but also the lifting and emplacing of specially built telephone poles themselves! A most interesting proposition. Especially to the communicators who can see the helicopter relieving them of much of the back-breaking effort of manhandling wire through rough terrain when tying-in a permanent installation.

There are serious, but not insurmountable, limitations to the ability of the helicopter to dispense drum-wound wire—limitations which render drum-wound wire less desirable than the high-speed dispenser MX-306A for field use. In laying wire from any drum, the helicopter cannot be flown at ground speeds greater than approximately 25 knots because of the tremendous speed with which the drum and wire will rotate. Wind direction and velocity will thus have tremendous effect on laying drum-wound wire. When the wind exceeds 15 knots it is impossible to lay wire by this method in a down-wind direction, because of control difficulties within the helicopter, particularly during a hover when the craft must be held motionless while fresh drums are being spliced into place. Ambient temperatures and altitude also play an important part in whether or not wire can be successfully dispensed from drums. During the course of these experiments, which were conducted at sea level in temperatures which never exceeded 68 degrees Fahrenheit, it was impossible to hover the aircraft out of "ground effect" while new drums were spliced into place, at gross weights in excess of 6,800 lbs (approximately 400 lbs less than the aircraft's normal take-off gross



By drum — best for permanent installations over rough terrain

weight). Approximately 15 per cent of any drum-wound wire may be wasted during a laying operation of this type. Each drum being dispensed must be stopped before it is exhausted, and a new drum spliced into place before continuing. This means stopping the rotation of the drum while it still contains a small amount of wire and hovering the aircraft for periods of 60-90 seconds while the fresh drums are spliced and installed in the arbor assembly. Experienced crews should be capable of materially reducing this time and waste, however.

In spite of the above shortcomings, drum-wound wire is still capable of being dispensed from helicopters in less time and over terrain that is impassable by other means. It should have tremendous potentialities in establishing permanent installations over rough terrain.

The true forte of the helicopter in the wire-laying field, however, lies in dispensing Wire WD 1/TT from the high-speed dispenser, MX-306A; and may well be the means of tying-in by wire the dispersed formations to be employed in the vertical envelopment scheme discussed by Mr Montross. For, by making very little preparation and by using relatively inexperienced flight crews, it is entirely feasible to make successful

wire lays at speeds of one-mile-of-wire-per-minute-of-flying-time over almost any type of terrain including mountainous, wooded, impassable marshes, even across rivers and other bodies of water. Using WD-1TT wire and U-96/U waterproof connectors, the author on one occasion laid 6 miles of wire, which after 7 days' immersion in salt water still gave loud and clear reception. The only limitations to this type of wire laying are the electrical characteristics of the WD-1/TT wire, which cannot be laid over distances exceeding 12.5 miles without the addition of suitable loading coils; and the allowable maximum gross weight of the aircraft at the elevation of the terrain over which it is to work.

In short, the present transport helicopter in use by the Marine Corps and the high-speed dispenser were made for each other in the field of wire laying and are certainly capable of the greatest exploitation.

The preparations required for wire laying via helicopter are of the simplest. Normally, a crew of 4 are sufficient when the HRS helicopter is employed — pilot, copilot, 2 telephone wiremen (a payout man and assistant). Very little need be done to the aircraft to prepare it for wire-laying. The cargo compartment should be cleared of seats, tool

boxes, etc. The sonar door in the center of the compartment should be cleared from the aircraft; and if drum wound wire is to be laid, the RL-31 reel and arbor assembly must be secured over the 3-foot sonar well in the deck of the cargo compartment. The payout man and his assistant should each be equipped with the following tools: Tool Equipment TE-33; Lineman's Belt LC-23 (to be attached to aircraft to prevent falling out during laying operations); Lineman's Gloves LC-10; and sufficient Insulating Tape or waterproof connectors to splice the rolls of wire together.

In using the Dispenser MX-306-A/G sufficient dispensers should be prespliced together before take-off to complete the mission plus an additional 10 per cent reserve. Thus, if a mission calls for laying wire over a route 5 miles in length, the pilot should carry 11 half-mile dispensers, prespliced. He will thus be assured of a spare half-mile of wire for emergency use. Nothing can be more frustrating than to make an apparently successful wire lay over rugged terrain under difficult circumstances only to discover that you ran out of wire a hundred yards short of your objective.


Troop units requesting helicopter wire-laying missions should give specific information as to: target area locations of the desired terminal ends of the lay; desired route of lay; panel displays or other means of identifying the wire drop sites and air-ground communications procedures. These items, plus other available information, should be sufficient for the pilot to complete a successful wire-laying mission.

Any helicopter pilot flying a wire-laying mission should first make a reconnaissance of his proposed route to determine the following: pinpoint location of terminal points; terrain obstacles, streams, hill masses, etc. which will influence his choice of a route; roads, trails, etc. which would require "overheading" the wire (helicopters are adept at "overheading" telephone wire in that all the pilot has to do is pick out two trees on opposite sides of a road and "fly" his wire across these trees for a quick and easy installation).

The force and direction of the wind along the route plays an im-

portant part in helicopter wire-laying. First, because telephone wire is dispensed in terms of ground speed not air speed, at which the aircraft is flown (a fact which can cause great embarrassment to the unwary). A helicopter pilot laying at an airspeed of 60 knots in a downwind direction in a 20 knot wind is making good a ground speed of some 80 knots. This is far too fast for even the best wire-laying crews. Cross winds can be equally important with the free-falling telephone wire. I know of one instance in which a pilot was laying wire along the edge of an unimproved road, or at least he thought it was the edge. He had neglected the effect of a brisk crosswind which from his altitude of 100 feet was blowing his line into the middle of the road. Grist for the mill of the next 6x6 or M4 that came along!

Once the briefing and other preparations have been taken care of, the actual laying of the wire can be re-



By MX-306A—one mile per minute

duced to a simple matter of timing between the pilot and his crew. As the plane passes over the initial drop point (start of lay) the pilot instructs his crew to "drop it," at which time the assistant payout man drops the weighted end of wire from the dispenser and the payout man holds successive dispensers low in the sonar well of the 'copter as they are passed to him by his assistant. After the

terminal end of the lay is passed the pilot calls "cut it." The crew jettisons the remaining wire and another successful wire-laying mission is completed.

Simple, isn't it? And it can be even easier with well-trained, properly briefed crews.

The helicopter can be put to other uses, particularly to security conscious communications officers who wish to tie-in their ship-shore radio nets loud and clear as soon as they reach the beach. The helicopter can offer them a real aid in this respect besides giving them a degree of security from enemy monitors they never dreamed of!

To them I say this, "Next time you have a field exercise call for a helicopter to lay a "tree-top" antenna for your Radio Set AN/GRC-9 or other HF equipment employing a whip antenna." A "tree-top" antenna is a half-mile of telephone wire laid along the uppermost branches of the trees in the direction of desired transmission and inductively coupled to the stub of the AN/GRC-9 whip antenna by looping a few turns of the wire around it.

Field tests made with this antenna show that, unless it touches the ground someplace along its length, loud and clear voice radio communications are possible well in excess of 25 miles. Under the same conditions, using the whip antenna alone, reliable communications are impossible beyond a distance of 5 or 6 miles. Add to this the fact that this particular antenna is so polarized that in the opposite direction (away from the tree-top antenna) the signal fades out within 2 or 3 miles. A very nice expedient is found which gives not only increased range but also increased security.

Recent TRAEX operations have served to point out not only the troop and cargo capabilities of the transport helicopter (which are well known), but also those other roles, too often overlooked, which are none the less important if this most flexible of machines is to reach its fullest utilization.

The helicopter has earned a place in Marine Aviation. The importance of that place will be determined not only by the skill, but also by the imagination of those of us responsible for its employment. US MC

passing in review

BOOKS OF
INTEREST TO
OUR READERS

Distorted Picture . . .

WAR OF WITS—Ladislav Farago.
347 pages, illustrations. New York:
Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1954. \$5.00

In his current book, entitled *War of Wits*, Mr Farago has undertaken to write a book for the general reader on the nature and meaning of intelligence, espionage, sabotage, counterespionage and propaganda.

I am not personally acquainted with the author's previous work, though the flyleaf of the present volume credits him with 8 other books including one that was co-authored with Adm E. M. Zacharias. The publisher notes that during World War II, Mr Farago served with the US Navy as Chief of Research Planning, Special Warfare Branch. Further, that the author of *War of Wits* is "almost the only professional writer to have worked inside an intelligence organization . . . and his work has brought him into contact with many of the great spies and spymasters of the modern age." So much for Mr Farago's qualifications.

The present book is written with much erudition. The author ranges from ancient to modern history for examples to emphasize his points. I cannot comment on the accuracy of Mr Farago's ancient history, but I am morally certain that some of his modern history is open to question. Let me give you a few illustrations of what I have in mind.

In the section devoted to the importance of intelligence, the author says (page 74): "If ever proof were needed that faulty intelligence or lack of intelligence results in confusion, delays and high casualties, the invasion of Tarawa in November 1943 supplied this proof. . . . Since the landing craft could not traverse the reefs, *whose existence had been unknown to our intelligence* (italics mine) the men had to wade ashore or be ferried to battle in little 'alligators,' cruelly exposed to enemy fire."

Although further comment on this passage is probably superfluous, I cannot but wonder why Mr Farago thought the 2d MarDiv had the foresight to provide themselves with the "little alligators" he mentions? Was it just happenstance they obtained these amphibious vehicles that were then in such painfully short supply? Or was it because Maj-Gen Julian C. Smith and his staff were well aware of Tarawa's reefs and had conducted exhaustive tests

tained a copy of the order halting von Runstedt's Panzer formations—all this is within the realm of possibility, though I would like to call your attention to one or two inconsistencies a little later. But then the author says (pages 84-85): "The British patrol . . . snatched the briefcase from the flames . . . its contents were examined by British intelligence officers. They were reluctant to believe what they saw. But the captured document was rushed to



with the amphibian tractors in the Fijis, as well as conducting landing exercises with the tractors in New Zealand in March and April of 1943? The official, fully-documented Marine Corps monograph on Tarawa should be able to clear up any doubt on these points.

In discussing the events that took place at Dunkirk at the end of May 1940, Mr Farago advances a very novel reason for the successful evacuation of an impressive number of Allied troops from beneath the very nose of the attacking Germans. The incident related here might have taken place as alleged, but the inference drawn from the incident will scarcely square with documented facts.

The contention that a British patrol retrieved a German staff officer's briefcase from a burning automobile and that the briefcase con-

. . . Gen Lord Gort, commander in chief of the BEF. Incredible as it must have seemed, the British had but one alternative in their desperate situation—to accept it as a miraculous reprieve. Gort issued orders to strengthen his southern flank. Then he speeded up the march of the troops on Dunkirk."

The passage just quoted certainly gives a strong impression that until the briefcase of the improvident German staff officer was allowed through crass carelessness to fall into British hands, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Forces was in a complete swivet, with neither the plan nor the means to extricate his force. But the facts of the matter are somewhat different.

It was "as far back as the 19th of May when Lord Gort first reported to the War Office that retreat to

Dunkirk might become inevitable. Inter-departmental consultations which eventually resulted in the Admiralty plan 'Dynamo' began next day." (Plan "Dynamo" was the plan for the evacuation via Dunkirk.) "Sunday evening, May the 26th, shortly before seven o'clock the Admiralty sent the signal 'Operation Dynamo is to commence.'" The two passages I have just quoted are taken from pages 178 and 182 of *The War in France and Flanders* (Ellis, HMSO, London, 1953), one of the volumes of the official United Kingdom history of the Second World War. It would seem to me that things were pretty well clewed up even without an odd briefcase or two, though it's simply a matter of opinion.

I might mention in passing that Mr. Farago, in discussing the reasons for the halting of the German Panzers short of Dunkirk, falls into the trap of the uninformed and blames this decision on Hitler. There is ample evidence now available to show that it was von Runstedt's own decision based on good military reasons, and the decision was simply approved by Hitler on the 23d of May. But it was Hitler who gave the order on the 26th for the German armor to continue their advance. The attack of the British armor in the vicinity of Arras on the 21st had considerable influence in von Runstedt's decision to close up his armor on the Canal line. Moreover, both of von Runstedt's armored group commanders, Kleist and Guderian, when they saw the place at close hand thought that tanks should not be used to attack Dunkirk.

I had the feeling throughout my reading of *War of Wits* that we were very often being given only part of the story and that the part given was slanted. I suppose this is legitimate enough on occasion, but a little of it goes an awfully long way. This practice also points up the lack of substance in the author's example under consideration. Thus, in discussing the British aerial attack on the German rocket-development center at Peenemunde, the author points out that it was the bright eye of a British WAF that spied out the launching ramps on the aerial photo and made the proper deduction.

Quite possibly so, and all credit to a pretty girl (her picture appears in the book), but why were the British reconnaissance planes making the long and hazardous flight to photograph a lonely little cluster of houses on the Baltic that was Peenemunde? The answer to that question involves some of the most fascinating intelligence work accomplished during the course of the entire war. And almost all of it was done by a few people patiently poring over regular daily newspapers from enemy territory. It's a pity that the author didn't see fit to give his readers the whole story.

I admire the industry of any man who can produce a book. Mr. Farago has his moments and there is an interesting section on the subject of propaganda. But the inaccuracies that dot the pages of *War of Wits*, only a few of which I have mentioned here, seriously shake my confidence in the value of this particular book. I do not, therefore, recommend it for the general reader, much less the serious military professional.

Reviewed by Col R. McC. Tompkins



The Human Side . . .

THEY CALLED HIM STONEWALL—Burke Davis. 470 pages, illustrated. New York: Rhinehart & Co. \$5.00

Good biographies of great military leaders are few and far between. Most of them bog down in more or less a detail of military achievement, with the human side of the man being completely neglected.

The author of *They Called Him Stonewall* has achieved a happy medium in this life of the great

Confederate leader. He presents the man as well as the military genius, in a most dramatic and completely absorbing style. It adds to the great store of information on Jackson so superbly documented in that military classic *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War* by Col Henderson of the British Army. In fact it is the first biography of Jackson in the last 50 years. For this reason alone it warrants study by the military student. It is so well written that the casual reader will find it highly entertaining and absorbing.

The book is divided into three parts. The first part deals with Jackson's classic campaign in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia with his Valley Army. A brief flash-back reveals Jackson's early life, his experience in the Mexican War and his early fame at the First Battle of Manassas. The second part opens with the Seven Days Battle around Richmond followed by Second Manassas, Antietam and Fredericksburg, where he was corps commander in Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. The third and final part is a stirring and dramatic account of the battle of Chancellorsville and Jackson's death.

Throughout, the book is flavored with anecdotes of Jackson's life as told by his officers and men who idolized him. His incredible bravery is well described and makes inspiring reading.

The author had many sources not available to earlier biographers from which to draw regarding Jackson's personal and religious life and their effect on his military career.

It is pointed out that while Jackson always gave credit to the Lord for his success he was ably assisted by such subordinates as Ewell, A. P. Hill and Garnett. This is of particular importance because Jackson seldom informed either his staff or his division commanders of either their destination or his plan of attack until the battle was practically joined.

Accounts of Jackson's staff organization and use of his staff are well documented and interestingly presented to the reader.

As a whole, it is one of the best biographies in years.

Reviewed by LtCol R. S. Johnson

Military Opus . . .

A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD—Volume I: From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Lepanto. Major General J. F. C. Fuller. New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1954. 602 pages, 34 maps. \$6.00

It is safe to describe MajGen Fuller as perhaps the greatest living military innovator, thinker and writer. This allegation is substantiated by his being the father of armored warfare, for years the leader of the *avant garde* of ground military thought and author of over 30 books on diverse military subjects. *A Military History of the Western World* in three volumes, of which this is the first, is the fruit of 30 years' labor on his part.

In 1923, as an instructor at the British staff college, he discovered that the students, the very people who most needed a study of military history and who should be most interested in it, neglected it. As he very correctly points out "the more we study the history of war, the more we shall be able to understand war itself, and seeing that it is now the dominant factor, until we do understand it, how can we hope to regulate human affairs?" One reason for this unprofessional neglect, he perceived, was the lack of a suitable text—a text covering, not just a campaign or two, but the whole sweep of the world's military history. He determined to fill that need.

Thus, by 1940, two volumes were published. Fuller says that he was not too satisfied with the result and an enemy bombing raid which destroyed the whole stock gave him the opportunity for revision. All chapters and chronicles were expanded and rewritten and as many more added as two volumes became three. Actually the three volumes are not merely a revision but a wholly new work.


He uses as a framework for this ambitious undertaking the decisive battles which began, changed or ended great historic periods. This framework is filled in with related campaigns and wars and their influence on history. Each decisive battle takes a chapter. To ensure continuity, the chapters are linked together by chronicles which introduce each

period and place it in its political and economic setting. The chronicles also bring out the development of armament, tactics and strategy through the ages and the characters of the great commanders of history.

In the 20 chapters and 19 intervening chronicles of Volume I, Fuller leads us from the early wars of the Egyptians and Greeks through ancient and medieval history to the crushing defeat of Turkish seapower by Spaniards and Italians at Lepanto in 1571. Volume II is planned to carry the student through the Waterloo campaign and Volume III from that to the present.

tive views and searching analyses make his latest and greatest work not only a pleasure to read and savor but also intellectually rewarding. We have had, in the past, several good one-volume world military histories covering battles, campaigns, wars and the development of armament, tactics and strategy. But for wider use in the military age in which we now find ourselves, Fuller's *magnum opus* will long be a landmark for its greater scope, detail, authoritativeness and the manner in which military history is integrated with political history.

Reviewed by LtCol Brooke Nihart



Upon close study of western military history, certain constantly recurring themes become apparent. While in no way belabored by the author, they are implicit throughout. In the larger sense this history is a struggle of the West against incursions by the East—Egyptian against Hyskos, Greek against Persian, Roman against Goth, Frank against Hun, Christian against Moslem, European against Turk and new Western Christendom against Eastern Communism. Strategically, the recurring theme is the truism that military victories are barren unless accompanied by political victories as well. Tactically, down through the pages of history, victory has gone to the side which most appropriately combined the elements of missile power, shock action and mobility.

MajGen Fuller's fine literary style, his keen insight into matters military and political, his own provoca-

Partisan View . . .

POWER AND POLICY—Thomas K. Finletter. 408 pages. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. \$5.00

Karl Mannheim, in several of his works discusses man as a victim of his own *zeinsverbundenheit*, or world view. Each of us holds a world view, he says, depending largely on our family and upbringing, education, nationality, social position and so forth. Our author, Mr Finletter, is identified on the flyleaf by his publishers as a lawyer and also a student of politics and foreign affairs who has served, since 1941, as a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; as chairman of the President's Air Policy Commission (1947); as Minister to Great Britain in charge of the first Marshall Plan Mission (1948-49) and as Secretary of the Air Force (1950-53).

In *Power and Policy* the author's experience is brought to bear on the international military-political

problems our nation faces today. His views, particularly on military affairs, reflect his orientation. In his favor it must be said that he makes little pretense of objectivity. His book is frankly partisan.

The book consists of four parts: Defense of the US, Struggle against Communism in the "Gray Areas," US Military Policy and the Search for Peace. Each contributes directly or indirectly to the thesis of the book, the need for overwhelming US air power.

A massive retaliatory capability is established as the keystone of US policy—the means by which the spread of Communism will be halted. The author asserts that the US must build and maintain an overwhelming atomic-air capability to support this policy. US air power must be of such magnitude and so disposed that, should the USSR launch a surprise atomic assault, it can be absorbed with sufficient atomic-air remaining to deliver a paralyzing counterattack upon the USSR.

We do not, in Mr Finletter's view, have anywhere near this requirement at present. To gain an adequate force structure would require 18-20 billion dollars annually for several years, an amount which could be obtained through the "proper" allocations of funds budgeted for national defense. A "proper" allocation of funds is not being accomplished due to the system utilized for determining force requirements. The "division-by-service" method is described as providing imbalance in the structure for national security—too many nonessential ground and naval forces and insufficient air forces.

This defect should be cured, according to Finletter, by determining force requirements on a priority basis as follows:

First: NATO Atomic-Air

Second: Air Defense of the US

Third: Ground, sea and non-atomic air required for NATO. It is no accident that a large part of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps do not fall under any of these categories. Finletter's view is that such forces are not essential and since vast sums of money are required to maintain the atomic-air forces, these nonessential elements should be provided only after priorities 1, 2

and 3 have been met. Even then, the only purpose of such forces is to establish small symbolic forces in the "Gray Areas;" that is, those nations which are not Communist dominated but which are not bound



to us or to each other by NATO-like agreement.

Basically *Power and Policy* proposes a military solution to a problem which is not wholly military—the grave problem of halting and rolling back Communism. The author is preoccupied, moreover, with the danger at the front door to the virtual exclusion of the danger at the back door. But while International Communism may have

knocked on the front door, it has been gaining entry at the back door. Our massive retaliatory capability stood ready, poised but unused, as Communism expanded unchecked in many portions of the globe—Korea, Indochina.

The author observes that in this hydrogen age the danger of war would be mainly in the "Gray Areas" where "blundering" by either side might start a chain of happenings, of which the end would be "Hydrogen War." This taken in conjunction with the thesis that our armed forces should be tailored almost exclusively to NATO and to an atomic air war suggests that Mr Finletter sees no practicable alternative to the progressive loss to the Communist orbit of those areas and populations.

To shrug off this critical problem in this manner, simply because it is inconsistent with one's concept of the proper structure of the armed forces, is unrealistic in the extreme. As a policy it would insure the ultimate isolation of NATO and its ultimate defeat.

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Better to tailor the armed forces for the total job rather than exclusively to the NATO missions and hydrogen air war.

Fortunately, this is entirely feasible and it must be attributed to a conservative strain in Mr Finletter that he does not perceive this. In the presence of the hydrogen weapon which he regards as the "intolerable absolute," he is unable to break with tradition in his concept of strategic air power—visualizing it as an overwhelming number of conventional atomic bomb carriers.

How erroneous this concept is was indicated in a recent televised program of the Georgetown University Forum. James Shepley, co-author of *The Hydrogen Bomb*, stated that one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had expressed the view to him that 8 hydrogen weapons properly distributed in that portion of the US east of the Mississippi would effectively neutralize the entire area. In the face of such potentialities the atomic bomb fleets of the post-World War II period have been overcome by technological obsolescence. The overwhelming capacity for massive retaliation can now be maintained at far less cost than when atomic weapons only were available.

Communist Web ...

THE FALL OF A TITAN.—Igor Gouzenko, translated from the Russian by Mervyn Black, 629 pages. New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc. \$4.50

A courageously written book giving insight to the web of local organization and activity of the Communist Party in Russia during the middle '30s depicting the struggle of the Russian people against the organization and of members of the organization against themselves. It is traditionally Russian, not only in length, but in the brilliant portrayal of the emotional strain and compulsion, which as a weapon of Stalin, brought about the death of the Old Russian and created the new Soviet citizen.

The author is the same Igor Gouzenko, who as a member of the Soviet Embassy staff in Ottawa, slipped out of the grasp of the Communists during the night of 5 September 1945 with 109 secret docu-

ments to expose the vast Russian spy network operating in Canada. Living under Dominion protection, Gouzenko spent 4 years writing his novel and carefully approving the translation into English by Mervyn Black. Much of the experience of Gouzenko himself as an active party member serves to authenticate and enrich the content material but it is not in any way an autobiography or an actual account of his political record.


The central figure of the novel, Feodor Novikov, is an ambitious scholar and university professor who accepts Communism as an escape from hunger, poverty and persecution. Through his ability to rewrite history according to the Soviet need and pleasure he wins promotion and favor within the Rostov party organization and emerges under the approving scrutiny of Stalin himself. As a tool of the party he is assigned the delicate, but herculean, task of Sovietizing the famous idealistic writer Mikhail Gorin, who is portrayed as the great literary titan, Maxim Gorki.

Gorin, whose writings assisted and inspired the Revolution, passively turns against the Reds when he witnesses the evil effects of his work. The co-operation of Gorin still required by the Reds, Novikov, in his assignment mentally and psychologically duels with Gorin, winning temporary victory and submission of the writer to the State. The effort, however, requires Novikov to sacrifice his true love for Gorin's daughter, to desert his party selected wife when her father is purged, to turn against his own brother, and even to turn temporarily against the party and himself.

Not a book to be read at a single sitting, its length does not in any way detract from its interest, for it serves to answer many questions alive in the minds of Americans today: how Soviet control is maintained within the USSR; why Communists exist; what freedoms remain for the Russian people and what do the people think and feel about the horde that has invaded their native Russia? It is a book that had to be born in Russia for publication only beyond its borders.

Reviewed by Maj E. F. Danowitz

Marine Corps Gazette • February, 1955



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SQUADS RIGHT

Company Drill

MOVEMENTS AT EASE OR AT ROUTE STEP. The column of squads is habitual column of route, but "Route Step" and "At Ease" are applicable to any marching formation. To march in "Route Step" the command is 1. *Route step*, 2. MARCH. The men carry their pieces at will, keeping the muzzles elevated; they are neither required to preserve silence, nor to keep the step. Under favorable marching conditions platoons may be required to maintain cadence.


To open or close ranks—The company being in line or column of platoons the command is: 1. *Open*

When the company is in a column of platoons, the leading platoon executes the movement as described for the right platoon. Leaders of platoons in rear of the leading platoon place their right guides so as to cover at the proper distance and give the necessary command for opening ranks. Platoon guides remain at the order. Ranks are closed as for the platoon.


On right (left) into line—The company being in column of squads or platoons, to form line on the flank, the command is: 1. *On right (left) into line*, 2. MARCH, 3. *Company*, 4. HALT.

The command HALT is given when the leading platoon has advanced the desired distance in the new direction; it halts, and is dressed to the right by its leader. The other platoons complete the movement, each being halted one pace in the rear of the line being established by the leading platoon and then dressed to the right.


The company being in a column of platoons, at the command *On right into line*, the leader of the leading platoon commands: *Right turn*. If at a halt, each platoon leader in rear commands *Forward*. Each of the platoon leaders in rear



**Right front into line
from column of squads**



On right into line



**Right front into line
from column of platoons**

ranks, 2. MARCH.

When the company is in line the platoon leader of the right platoon repeats the preparatory command of the company commander; other platoon leaders command: *Stand fast*.

At the command "March," the right platoon opens ranks as prescribed for the platoon.

The other platoon leaders successively give the necessary commands for opening ranks, each as soon as the leader of, or next toward, the base platoon commands, "Front."

The company being in column of squads, at the command, "on right into line," the leader of the leading platoon commands: *Squads right*. If at halt, each platoon leader in rear commands: *Forward*. At the command MARCH, the leading platoon marches into line to the right; the platoons in rear continue to march to the front until opposite their places to the left of the preceding platoon, when they are marched in line to the right and formed successively on the left.

of the leading platoon gives the command: 1. *Right turn*, 2. MARCH, when his platoon arrives opposite the right of its place in line. The preparatory command is given in time to add the command MARCH at the moment of arrival in rear of its place in line.

The command HALT is given and the movement completed as explained above.

If the movement is executed in double time, the leading platoon marches in double time until halted.

Front into line—The company being in column of squads or platoons, to form line to the front, the command is: 1. *Right (left) front into line*, 2. **MARCH**.

The company being in column of squads, at the command "Right front into line," all the platoon leaders command: *Column right*. At the command **MARCH**, the leading platoon executes "Column right" and, as the last squad completes the change of direction, is formed in line to the left, halted and dressed to the left. The platoons in rear execute "Column right" at the command **MARCH** and are similarly formed in line when opposite their respective places. They are halted when one place in rear of the line established by the leading platoon and dressed to the left.

The company being in column of platoons, if marching, the leading platoon halts at the command

company being in column of squads, to form column of platoons successively to the right or left, the command is: 1. *Column of platoons*, 2. *Leading platoon, squads right (left)*, 3. **MARCH**. At the command **MARCH**, the leading platoon executes squads right and moves forward. The other platoons move forward in column of squads and successively march in line to the right on the same ground as the leading platoon and in such manner that the guide of each platoon covers the guide of the preceding platoon.

To form column of squads successively to the right or left—The company being in column of platoons, to form column of squads successively to the right or left, the command is: 1. *Column of squads*, 2. *Leading platoon, squads right (left)*, 3. **MARCH**.

At the command **MARCH**, the leading platoon executes squads right


turns to the right on a moving pivot, the platoon adding: 1. *Forward*, 2. **MARCH** upon completion of the turn.

The other platoons march squarely up to the turning point, each changes direction by the same commands and means as the first and in such manner that the right guide covers the right guide of the preceding platoon.


The guide changes *to right*, if not already there, as soon as the change in direction is begun by each platoon, and is so announced by each platoon leader.

If deemed desirable or necessary, the guide is announced *right* by the company commander prior to the execution of the movement.


The company being in line of platoons or close line, to change direction, the command is: 1. *Company right (left)*, 2. **MARCH**, 3. *Company*, 4. **HALT**. The right platoon



"Column of platoons, leading platoon squads right" from column of squads



"Company right" platoons in column of squads



"Column of squads, leading platoon squads right" from column of platoons

MARCH. The platoon leader dresses his platoon to the left.

If at a halt, at the command *Right front into line*, the leader of the leading platoon commands: *Stand fast* and the leader of each platoon in the rear commands: *Squads right*. At the command **MARCH** the 1st platoon leader dresses his platoon to the left and each of the other platoon leaders conducts his platoon to its place in line as above.

To form column of platoons successively to the right or left—The

and moves forward. The other platoons move forward in column of platoons and successively march in column of squads to the right on the same ground as the leading platoon.

To change direction—a. The company being in column of platoons or close column, to change direction, the command is: 1. *Column right (left)*, 2. **MARCH**.

At the command *Column right*, the leader of the leading platoon commands: *Right turn*. At the command **MARCH** the leading platoon

changes direction to the right; the other platoons are marched by the shortest line to their places abreast of the first.

The command **HALT** is given when the right platoon has advanced the desired distance in the new direction; that platoon halts; the others halt successively on the line.

Being in column of squads, the company changes direction by the same commands and in the same manner as prescribed for the platoon.

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


Group I \$500.00



Col Robert Cushman, Jr USMC — His 20 years of service include duty as an instructor, Senior School, MCS, Head of the Amphibious Warfare Branch, ONR, service with CIA in 1951-3 and duty with the CINCNELM staff in Naples and London. He is now Director of the Plans-Operations Division of the Armed Forces Staff College.

Group II \$500.00



Capt Robert H. Piehl, USMC — Now headed out to the 1st Mar Div for a second tour of Korean duty, Capt Piehl was formerly supervisory examiner for tanks and amphibian tractors at the T&E Unit, MCS. On his first Korean tour he was with the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion, FMF Pac.

Group III \$500.00



SSgt Richard Fortner, USMC — Twice wounded in Korea, a former machine gun section leader and platoon sergeant of a rifle platoon, SSgt Fortner's *The Little Picture* was also awarded the additional "Best Essay" prize of \$500.00. He is currently a rifle marksmanship instructor at Parris Island.

Best Essay \$500.00

Honorable Mention



Sgt Henry I. Shaw, Jr USMCR — Winner of 1st Prize in Group III last year, SSgt Shaw's entry was the only honorable mention selected this year. He served on active duty during WWII and again during the Korean action. He is now working as a civilian writer in the Historical Branch, G-3, HQMC.



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